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Abstract 
In this dissertation I investigate whether market rewards to a pattern of increasing 
earnings vary with certain signals of whether the pattern is genuine or fabricated. 
Among these signals, I examine growth in cash flows, accrual-based earnings 
management, earnings management through the manipulation of real operating 
activities, and conservative accounting. The findings show that market participants 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms when their pattern of increasing earnings 
is supported by the same pattern of increasing cash flows. I also show that market 
participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspected of having engaged 
in accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation and overproduction to 
achieve the earnings pattern. However, market participants do not penalize firms 
suspected of having achieved the earnings pattern through the opportunistic reduction 
of discretionary expenses. Regarding the effects of conservative accounting on market 
rewards to a sequential pattern of increasing earnings, I predict that conditional 
conservatism enhances the credibility of earnings patterns by introducing constraints to 
income-increasing earnings management. Using several measures of conditional 
conservatism, the results show that market participants assign higher price-earnings 
multiples to firms with a long stream of earnings increases when their accounting is 
more conditionally conservative. 
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Resumen 
En esta tesis investigo si las recompensas de mercado a un patrón de aumentos anuales 
continuados en los beneficios varían de acuerdo con ciertas señales de si el patrón es 
auténtico o resultado de manipulaciones contables. En cuanto a estas señales, considero 
el crecimiento de los flujos de efectivo, la manipulación del resultado contable a través 
de devengos, la manipulación de las actividades operativas para mantener el patrón de 
incrementos del resultado, y el grado de conservadurismo contable de la empresa. Los 
resultados muestran que los inversores atribuyen mayores múltiplos precio-beneficio a 
las empresas cuando su patrón de aumento en los beneficios es respaldado por el mismo 
patrón de aumento en los flujos de efectivo. Los resultados también muestran que los 
inversores asignan múltiplos precio-beneficio más bajos a las empresas sospechosas de 
haber incurrido en manipulación contable a través de devengos, manipulación de ventas, 
y sobreproducción para lograr el patrón de los beneficios. Sin embargo, los participantes 
del mercado no penalizan las empresas sospechosas de haber logrado el patrón de 
beneficios a través de la reducción oportunista de los gastos discrecionales. En cuanto 
a los efectos de la contabilidad conservadora en las recompensas de mercado a un patrón 
secuencial de aumento en  los beneficios, espero que el conservadurismo condicional 
realce la credibilidad de los patrones de beneficio mediante la introducción de 
restricciones a la manipulación contable al alza. Utilizando varias medidas de 
conservadurismo condicional, los resultados muestran que los participantes del 
mercado asignan mayores múltiplos precio-beneficio a las empresas con un patrón 
continuado de aumento anual en los beneficios cuando su contabilidad es más 
condicionalmente conservadora. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In this dissertation, I investigate whether market rewards to a pattern of increasing 
earnings vary with certain signals of whether the pattern is genuine or fabricated. In 
particular, I empirically examine whether market participants price differently firms 
with a pattern of increasing earnings that at the same time (i) report the same pattern of 
increasing cash flows, (ii) have discretionary accruals that if not included in earnings 
would break the earnings trend, (iii) alter optimal operational transactions to avoid 
breaking the earnings pattern, and (iv) exhibit a higher degree of conditional 
conservatism to increase the credibility of the earnings pattern. 
The first article in the dissertation is entitled “Market Rewards to Patterns of 
Increasing Earnings: Do Cash Flow Patterns, Accruals Manipulation and Real 
Activities Manipulation Matter?” While prior research provides evidence of market 
rewards for firms with a long stream of earnings increases (Barth et al. 1999), and of 
earnings management to maintain the stream (Myers et al., 2007), I am not aware of 
any paper that directly analyzes whether the market rewards to these firms with a long 
stream of earnings increases differ with signals of whether the earnings stream is 
genuine or fabricated. In our empirical tests, I use growth in cash flows to assess 
whether the earnings pattern is real. I define non-suspect beaters as those firms with 
five years of consecutive increases both in earnings and in cash flows. I then identify 
two types of suspected firms: (a) firms with five years of consecutive earnings increases 
that present discretionary accruals that, if not included in earnings, would fail to report 
the pattern of increasing earnings, and (b) firms with five years of consecutive earnings 
increases that engage in inefficient operational practices with the objective of managing 
earnings, and that would have broken the pattern of increasing earnings in the absence 
of those inefficient operational practices. I expect suspected firms to, at least, receive 
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lower rewards than non-suspect beaters.  
The empirical analysis generates the following major findings. First, market 
participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters. Second, 
market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that use 
accrual-based earnings management to achieve a five-year pattern of increasing 
earnings. Third, the price-earnings multiples are reduced when the earnings pattern is 
achieved through increasing sales on credit beyond whatever is advisable by common 
practice. In addition, market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms 
suspected of having increased production more than necessary to reduce unit costs and 
increase earnings. However, market participants do not reduce rewards to firms 
suspected of producing the earnings pattern through reductions in discretionary 
expenses, such as R&D expenses, and selling, general, administrative and advertising 
expenses. 
This study contributes to three different strands of prior literature. First, this research 
differs from previous research in that I focus on the specific rewards to a long stream 
of consecutive earnings increases and on relatively simple signals of whether the stream 
is genuine or fabricated. Second, I contribute to the literature on the effects of real 
earnings management. The results that investors provide lower rewards to firms with 
signals of having used real earnings management to fabricate the streams are consistent 
with investors assuming that at least some types of real earnings management have 
negative effects for firm value. Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on 
earnings smoothing. From the pool of firms with a stream of increases in earnings, those 
that I label as suspected could be viewed as engaging in some sort of aggressive form 
of earnings smoothing to maintain the stream. The results that firms suspected of 
fabricating the earnings stream have the rewards reduced can be interpreted as 
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consistent with smoothing being penalized by market participants. 
The second article is entitled “The Effects of Conditional Conservatism on Market 
Rewards to Patterns of Increasing Earnings”. This study analyzes whether conditional 
conservatism affects market rewards to firms that report a long stream of consecutive 
increases in earnings. The prediction is that market rewards are higher for firms that 
exhibit a higher degree of conditional conservatism. Conditional conservatism is 
defined as the requirement of a lower degree of verification for the recognition of losses 
than for the recognition of gains in the financial statements, resulting in earnings 
reflecting bad news timelier than good news (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a). This study 
builds on the argument that conservative accounting serves as a governance control 
structure to curb managerial manipulation on earnings reporting (Watts, 2003, Guay 
and Verrechia, 2006; LaFond and Watts, 2008). Recent literature also provides 
consistent evidence that conservatism reduces opportunistic biases in financial 
accounting (Chen et al., 2007; García Lara et al., 2012; Gao, 2013). 
Using a large US sample I show that market participants assign higher price-earnings 
multiples to firms with a five-year pattern of earnings increases when these firms’ 
accounting is more conditionally conservative. These results hold after controlling for 
growth opportunities, firm’s financial and operating risks, market-to-book, and leverage, 
which are potentially correlated with proxies for conditional conservatism, and with 
firm’s stock price. In addition, I also control for fixed effects of industry and year. 
This study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, I connect 
conservative accounting with a stream of research regarding market rewards on the 
achievement of earnings benchmarks. I am not aware of any paper that directly analyzes 
whether market rewards to firms with a long stream of increasing earnings differ with 
signals of whether the firms’ accounting is conditionally conservative. Second, this 
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study contributes to a stream of empirical research in accounting conservatism that 
shows conditional conservatism can lead to positive economic outcomes (LaFond and 
Watts, 2008; García Lara et al., 2011). Finally, I provide indirect evidence that 
conditional conservatism improves the information environment of the firm by 
offsetting income-increasing earnings management in financial reporting (Chen, 2007; 
García Lara et al., 2012; Gao, 2013). 
Finally, in chapter 4 I analyze the role of growth in sales as an additional way of 
identifying whether the pattern of earnings increases is genuine. I find that firms that 
report a long stream of consecutive earnings increases not accompanies by the same 
pattern of growth in sales do not have higher Price-Earnings multiples than firms that 
do not report the pattern of earnings increases. 
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Chapter 2. Market Rewards to Patterns of Increasing Earnings: Do Cash Flow 
Patterns, Accruals Manipulation and Real Activities Manipulation Matter? 
 
Abstract 
This study explores whether firms have differential price-earnings multiples associated 
with their means of achieving a sequential pattern of increasing positive earnings. Our 
main findings show that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to 
firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is supported by the same pattern of 
increasing cash flows. Market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to 
firms suspected of having engaged in accrual-based earnings management, sales 
manipulation, and overproduction to achieve the earnings pattern. We find, however, 
that market participants do not penalize firms suspected of having achieved the earnings 
pattern through the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.  
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2.1 Introduction 
    We empirically examine whether market participants price differently firms with a 
pattern of increasing earnings that at the same time (i) report the same pattern of 
increasing cash flows, (ii) have discretionary accruals that if not included in earnings 
would break the earnings trend, and (iii) alter optimal operational transactions to avoid 
breaking the earnings pattern. Prior studies show that market participants reward firms 
that meet or beat certain earnings benchmarks: prior year earnings (e.g., Barth et al., 
1999; Myers et al., 2007), analysts’ forecasts (e.g., Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; 
Bartov et al., 2002), or both (Koonce and Lipe, 2010). The results of prior research on 
whether the market rewards differently firms that manage their accounting numbers to 
meet or beat these targets are mixed. While some studies show that market rewards are 
reduced for habitual beaters of either prior year earnings or analysts’ forecasts that 
manage earnings (Francis et al., 2003), that analysts are able to detect firms that avoid 
reporting an earnings decrease through earnings management (Burgstahler and Eames, 
2003), and that abnormal returns do not exist for firms that meet or beat earnings 
forecasts through accruals management and real activities management in the UK 
(Athanasakou et al., 2011), other studies show evidence on the contrary. In particular, 
there is US-based evidence that market participants do not identify firms meeting or 
beating analysts’ forecasts through earnings management (e.g., Bartov et al., 2002; 
Chen et al., 2010), that market rewards still exist, at least in the short run, for firms that 
beat forecasts through real activities manipulation (Bhojraj et al. 2009), and that 
analysts are unable to detect earnings management to avoid losses (Burgstahler and 
Eames, 2003).  
  We add to this stream of literature focusing on trends of increasing earnings. While 
prior research provides evidence of market rewards for firms with a long stream of 
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earnings increases (Barth et al. 1999), and of earnings management to maintain the 
stream (Myers et al., 2007), we are not aware of any paper that directly analyzes 
whether the market rewards to these firms with a long stream of earnings increases 
differ with signals of whether the earnings stream is genuine or fabricated. In our 
empirical tests, we identify firms with obvious signals of not having managed earnings 
to fabricate the earnings stream. We denote these firms as non-suspect beaters. We 
define non-suspect beaters as those firms with five years of consecutive increases both 
in earnings and in cash flows. We then identify two types of suspected firms: (a) firms 
with five years of consecutive earnings increases that present discretionary accruals that, 
if not included in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and 
(b) firms with five years of consecutive earnings increases that engage in inefficient 
operational practices with the objective of managing earnings, and that would have 
broken the pattern of increasing earnings in the absence of those inefficient operational 
practices. We expect suspected firms to, at least, receive lower rewards than non-suspect 
beaters. 
Using a sample of 22,605 US listed non-financial, non-utility, and profit-making 
firm-year observations for the period 1995-2007, obtained from COMPUSTAT, our 
findings are consistent with Barth et al. (1999) that firms with a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms. Our 
empirical analysis also generates the following major findings. First, market 
participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters. Second, 
market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that use 
accrual-based earnings management to achieve a five-year pattern of increasing 
earnings. Third, the price-earnings multiples are reduced when the earnings pattern is 
achieved through sales manipulation, that is, through increasing sales on credit beyond 
14 
 
whatever is advisable by common practice. In addition, market participants assign 
lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspected of having increased production more 
than necessary to reduce unit costs and increase earnings. However, market participants 
do not reduce rewards to firms suspected of producing the earnings pattern through 
reductions in discretionary expenses, such as R&D expenses, and selling, general, 
administrative and advertising expenses. 
Our study contributes to three different strands of prior literature. First, it contributes 
to the literature on benchmark beating by showing that firms with a stream of 
consecutive earnings increases receive different market rewards depending on whether 
the firm shows signals of the stream being genuine (presenting also a stream of 
increases in cash flows) or the stream being fabricated. Prior research just documents 
the existence of rewards to the existence of the streams (Barth et al. 1999), and that the 
streams are in some cases fabricated (Myers et al., 2007). However, the evidence as to 
whether the rewards to the stream vary with whether the stream might have been 
fabricated is very limited. Only Francis et al. (2003), who focus on the related case of 
rewards to habitual beaters, and Burgstahler and Eames (2003), who focus on whether 
analysts identify firms that manage earnings in one given year to avoid reporting an 
earnings decrease, tackle a similar issue. Our research differs from theirs in that we 
focus on the specific rewards to a long stream of consecutive earnings increases and on 
relatively simple signals of whether the stream is genuine or fabricated. 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the effects of real earnings management. 
Prior research finds mixed results on whether real earnings management have negative 
(Bhojraj et al., 2009) or positive (Gunny, 2010) effects for firm value. Our results that 
investors provide lower rewards to firms with signals of having used real earnings 
management to fabricate the streams are consistent with investors assuming that at least 
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some types of real earnings management have negative effects for firm value.  
Finally, we also contribute to the literature on earnings smoothing. From the pool of 
firms with a stream of increases in earnings, those that we label as suspected could be 
viewed as engaging in some sort of aggressive form of earnings smoothing to maintain 
the stream. While some studies argue that smoothing has information value and, thus, 
might yield positive economic outcomes (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006; Markarian and 
Gill de Albornoz, 2012), others argue that smoothing is not informative and, thus, does 
not add value to the firm (Rountree et al., 2008; McInnis, 2010). Our results that firms 
suspected of fabricating the earnings stream have the rewards reduced can be 
interpreted as consistent with smoothing being penalized by market participants. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a discussion 
of the related literature and describes the hypotheses. Section 3 contains the research 
design. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical results. Section 5 reports 
robustness tests. Finally, section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.2 Prior Research and Development of the Hypotheses 
Recent research provides evidence that market participants reward firms that meet or 
beat certain earnings benchmarks, such as prior year earnings (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; 
Francis et al., 2003; Myers et al., 2007; Koonce and Lipe, 2010), and analysts’ forecasts 
(e.g., Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Bartov et al., 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). 
Regarding patterns of earnings increases, prior research shows that firms with a stream 
of increases in earnings enjoy higher price-earnings multiples (Barth et al. 1999), and 
positive abnormal returns (Myers et al., 2007). Koonce and Lipe (2010) conduct several 
experiments to investigate how and why investors react to these patterns, and conclude 
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that investors assign higher stock price to these firms because they consider a pattern 
of earnings increases as a signal of higher management’s credibility and better future 
prospects. Thus, the reward accrues to the firm through a decrease in the discount rate 
that investors apply (the firm appears as less risky), and through an increase in investors’ 
perception of the persistence of the firm’s earnings.1 Overall, this evidence is consistent 
with the results in the survey study in Graham et al. (2005) that managers seek to meet 
or beat earnings benchmarks to build credibility, and to inform about future growth 
prospects. 
Among the firms that report a pattern of consecutive increases in earnings, some may 
achieve the pattern through intrinsic performance, while others may engage in different 
forms of earnings management to fabricate the stream and mislead investors. Managers 
can be inclined to fabricate the earnings stream because they feel that doing so the firm 
will receive capital market rewards. They might also feel inclined to sustain an earnings 
trend because firms that end a stream of positive earnings increases suffer a larger than 
expected market penalty (e.g. Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kinney et al., 2002), and a 
larger than expected cut in managerial compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 2001). 
The study that provides evidence more directly related with managers using earnings 
management to fabricate the earnings trend is Myers et al. (2007). In particular, they 
show that firms reporting patterns of increasing earnings are likely to maintain or extend 
the patterns through various means of earnings management, including reporting more 
positive or negative special items, increasing stock repurchases, and adjusting effective 
tax rates. While the evidence on earnings management to maintain long earnings 
streams is more limited, there is a long stream of literature showing the existence of 
                                                      
1 Prior evidence on market rewards to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts is consistent with this 
view that rewards to benchmark beaters accrue to the firm through those two channels (Xie, 2011). 
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earnings management to meet or beat other benchmarks (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev, 
1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Kasznik, 1999). 
In our first strategy to identify whether the pattern of increasing earnings is genuine, 
we focus on cash flows. Dichev et al. (2013), in their survey of Chief Financial Officers 
(CFOs) show that CFOs believe that high quality earnings are those backed by cash 
flows. The idea that a misalignment between earnings and cash flows is indicative of 
earnings management is popular in the literature (i.e., Dechow and Dichev, 2002), and 
there is evidence that investors use cash flows to assess earnings quality (Kama and 
Melumad, 2012). Prior literature shows that there might be mispricing at the earnings 
announcement date driven by earnings management to avoid missing the earnings 
forecast. This mispricing is reduced once the full financial statements, including the 
cash flow statement, are disclosed (DeFond and Park, 2001; Baber et al., 2006). This 
prior evidence is consistent with information from the cash flow statement helping to 
detect earnings management to meet or beat targets. 
Given this evidence on the usefulness of cash flows to detect misreporting, we posit 
that a firm with a pattern of increasing earnings is non-suspect of having engaged in 
earnings management to fabricate the stream of consecutive earnings increases 
whenever the earnings pattern comes together with the same pattern of increasing cash 
flows. If financial analysts use this simple signal to identify non-suspect beaters, we 
argue that these non-suspect beaters (with patterns of consecutive increases both in 
earnings and in cash flows) will enjoy higher price-earnings multiples than firms with 
only a pattern of increasing earnings. This leads to the first hypothesis in the paper:  
H1: Investors assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms with a pattern of 
increasing earnings that is supported by the same pattern of increasing cash 
flows. 
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Earnings management can be achieved through accounting choices and estimates 
about accruals, and/or through altering reported earnings by adjusting the timing and 
the scale of underlying real business activities to mislead market participants. Our 
second set of hypotheses refers to whether market participants price differently firms 
suspected of maintaining the stream of consecutive earnings increases through the 
management of accruals, and/or the management of real operational activities.  
Prior research has not directly addressed whether market participants award lower 
rewards to firms with a pattern of increasing earnings and suspect of having fabricated 
the pattern through the management of accruals. There is only related evidence of 
whether investors penalize firms that managed accruals to meet or beat other 
benchmarks, and this evidence is mixed. 
On the one hand, several authors argue that investors are not able to identify firms 
that manage accruals. The result of the inability of investors to identify firms that 
manage earnings through accruals to beat the targets is that these firms obtain the same 
rewards as those benchmark beating firms that do not manage earnings. The evidence 
in Gleason and Mills (2008) is consistent with this view. They find that firms that beat 
the targets through discretionary accruals are not penalized, and argue this is the case 
as discretionary accruals are hardly visible. They also find that firms that decrease the 
tax-expense opportunistically to meet the targets are penalized, and they argue this is 
the case as the tax-expense is more visible for investors than discretionary accruals. 
In line with these visibility concerns, DeFond and Park (2001) and Baber et al. (2006) 
show that benchmark beating firms that manage earnings are not penalized at the 
earnings announcement date, but the rewards are substantially reduced in the coming 
months, once the full financial statements are known to investors. Also, Das et al. (2009) 
show that investors penalize benchmark beating firms if they present a substantial 
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change in earnings behavior in the fourth quarter with respect to the other quarters, as 
this is an obvious signal of earnings management. Also in line with the visibility 
concerns, Burgstahler and Eames (2003) show that analysts have problems to identify 
the firms that manage earnings to avoid small losses, but that they do a better job in 
identifying firms that manage accruals to avoid earnings declines. Finally, Francis et al. 
(2003), who look at habitual beaters of forecasts and prior year earnings, and 
Athanasakou et al. (2001), who look at analysts’ forecasts, show that the rewards to 
firms that manage earnings are reduced. 
On the other hand, in studies like Bartov et al. (2002) it is argued that investors do 
not penalize firms that meet or beat the targets (in their case, analysts’ forecasts) through 
accruals management because investors believe these firms are bound to perform better 
in the future than firms that do not manage earnings and miss the targets. Chen et al. 
(2010) also provide evidence along these lines. 
Regarding the manipulation of real operational activities to meet financial reporting 
goals, Roychowdhury (2006) finds empirical evidence that firms avoid reporting losses 
through temporal sales increases, overproduction, and the opportunistic reduction of 
discretionary expenses, such as R&D investment, selling, general and administrative 
(SGA) expenses and advertising expenses. The survey study conducted by Graham et 
al. (2005) shows that the majority of managers employ real activities management to 
meet or beat earnings benchmarks even though real activities management decreases 
future cash flows and firm value (Roychowdhury, 2006). While there is a long stream 
of literature showing that managers engage in real earnings management to beat 
earnings targets (e.g., Baber et al.,, 1991; Garcia Osma and Young, 2009; Gunny, 2010), 
the evidence on whether investors penalize benchmark beating firms that resort to real 
earnings management to beat the targets is more reduced, and to the best of our 
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knowledge there is not prior evidence on the particular case of rewards to long streams 
of earnings increases fabricated through real earnings management. 
The studies that are more closely related to our research questions are Bhojraj et al. 
(2009), Gunny (2010), Chen et al. (2010), and Athanasakou et al. (2011). Bhojraj et al. 
(2009) show that managers resort to real earnings management practices to meet 
earnings forecasts and that at least in the short term there are not penalties linked to real 
earnings management. However, the positive stock market effects reverse over a 3 year 
window. Similarly, Athanasakou et al. (2011) find that firms that resort to real earnings 
management to meet earnings benchmarks are penalized by market participants even in 
the same year. In line with the evidence in Bhojraj et al. (2009) and Athanasakou et al. 
(2011), Cohen and Zarowin (2010) find that firms that engage in real earnings 
management suffer severe declines in future operating performance. 
Contrary to these views, Chen et al. (2010) find that the rewards to benchmark beaters 
do not differ for firms that manage real activities. They argue this is so as real operations 
management is informative and help investors identify firms that will perform better in 
the future. In a related study, Gunny (2010) shows that firms that engage in real earnings 
management have better future performance. This provides indirect evidence consistent 
with Chen et al. (2010) that investors might see benchmark beating firms that resorted 
to inefficient operational practices to hit the target as better than firms that missed the 
targets. This evidence also links well with the expectations games in Stein (1989). 
Given that prior studies focus on short term earnings targets, we contribute to this 
stream of literature analyzing whether the capital markets benefits of firms with long 
streams of annual increases in earnings differ for firms with signals of having engaged 
in earnings management to fabricate the stream. We predict that price-earnings 
multiples are lower for firms achieving a pattern of increasing earnings either through 
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accrual-based earnings management and/or through real activities management. This 
leads to our second set of hypotheses: 
H2 (a): Investors reduce price-earnings multiples to firms achieving a 
pattern of increasing earnings through the opportunistic use of accruals.  
H2 (b): Investors reduce price-earnings multiples to firms achieving a 
pattern of increasing earnings through real activities management, including 
accelerating sales on credit beyond whatever is advisable by common 
practice, overproducing and opportunistically reducing discretionary 
expenses. 
 
While we expect that the capital market reward for firms with long streams of 
consecutive increases in earnings will be lower for those with signals of having 
fabricated the stream either through accruals or real earnings management, it is not clear 
though whether they will obtain a benefit vis-à-vis firms without a long stream of 
earnings increases. 
  
2.3 Research Design  
In our empirical tests, we choose a five-year pattern of increasing earnings as a cutoff 
based on the results in Barth et al. (1999). The basic results do not change when we use 
different lengths of patterns of earnings increases.   
2.3.1 Estimation model 
We conduct our analysis by estimating the following regression: 
ܴܲܫܥܧ௜,௧ ൌ 	 		ߚ଴ ൅ 	ߚଵ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚଶ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚଷ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦܥܨܱ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚସ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܷܵܵܲܧܥܶ_ܣܥܥܴܷܣܮ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚହ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܷܵܵܲܧܥܶ_ܵܣܮܧ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚ଺	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܷܵܵܲܧܥܶ_ܴܱܲܦ5௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚ଻	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܷܵܵܲܧܥܶ_ܦܫܺܲ5௜,௧	
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																					൅	ߚ଼	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄5,௜,௧ ൅ ߚଽ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧	
																					൅	ߚଵ଴	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܧݒܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଵଵ	ܤܸ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	                (1) 
Where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. PRICE is share price at the fiscal year 
end (COMPUSTAT #199). EPS is income before extraordinary items, NIBE 
(COMPUSTAT #18), divided by number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS, 
(COMPUSTAT #54).  
Throughout our tests and to identify firms that report a pattern of increasing earnings, 
we focus on income before extraordinary items, NIBE. Equation (1) includes an 
indicator variable DBEAT5୧୲  that takes value 1 if firm i  continuously reports 
increasing positive earnings for five years, and 0 otherwise. We expect that βଶ  is 
positive, indicating that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing positive earnings 
have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms (Barth et al., 1999).  
We refer to firms with a five-year pattern both in earnings increases and cash flows 
increases as non-suspect beaters. We create an indicator variable DCFO5୧୲  that 
captures whether a firm reports a pattern of increasing cash flows, regardless of whether 
the pattern of increasing cash flows is linked to a pattern of increasing in earnings. We 
identify non-suspect beaters using an interaction term DBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ taking the 
value of 1 if firm i reports a five-year pattern of increases in positive earnings and in 
positive cash flows, and 0 otherwise. Regarding whether there are additional rewards 
to non-suspect beaters, we expect coefficient βଷ to be positive, implying that non-
suspect beaters ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ ൌ 1ሻ  enjoy higher price-earnings multiples 
than the rest of firms with a pattern of increasing earnings ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DCFO5୧୲ ൌ 0ሻ. 
For the test of market rewards to firms suspected of having engaged in earnings 
management to achieve the earnings pattern, we expect that market participants assign 
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lower price-earnings multiples to suspect firms. The indicator variable 
SUSPECT_ACCR5୧,୲  captures whether firms would fail to achieve the pattern of 
increasing earnings if discretionary accruals are not included in earnings. We expect 
that suspect firms (DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_ACCR5୧,୲ ൌ 1 ) are penalized by market 
participants, leading to lower price-earnings multiples. If that is the case, we expect 
coefficient βସ  to be negative. SUSPECT_SALE5୧,୲  is a dummy variable indicating 
whether firms would fail to achieve the pattern of increasing earnings if the effect of 
sales manipulation is not included in earnings. We expect coefficient βହ to be negative, 
implying those suspected firms ሺDBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_SALE5୧,୲ ൌ 1ሻ are penalized 
by market participants. We use an indicator variable SUSPECT_PROD5୧,୲ to capture 
whether firms would fail to sustain a five-year pattern of increasing earnings if the effect 
of overproduction is not included in earnings. We expect that coefficient β଺ is negative, 
implying that market participants reduce price-earnings multiples to those suspect firm. 
Finally, the indicator variable SUSPECT_DIXP5୧,୲ captures whether firms would fail to 
report a five-year pattern of increasing earnings if the effect of the opportunistic 
reduction of discretionary expenses is not included in earnings. We expect coefficient 
β଻ to be negative, indicating that market participants reduce price-earnings multiples 
to firms suspected of having engaged in discretionary expenses management to 
fabricate the earnings stream.  
Finally, following Barth et al. (1999) we add four controls: Growth5, Leverage, Evar 
and BVS. Growth5 is the five-year compound growth rate of book value of equity 
(COMPUSTAT #60). We predict β଼ to be positive. Leverage is defined as the sum of 
short-term debt due within one year and long-term debt, divided by market value of 
equity (COMPUSTAT #34 + COMPUSTAT #9) /(COMPUSTAT #199 * COMPUSTAT 
#25). Evar is measured as the variance of the past five years’ percentage change in 
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earnings ሺNIBE୧,୲ െ NIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ/absሺNIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ. Leverage is a measure of financial 
risk and Evar is a measure of operating risk. We expect βଽ and βଵ଴ to be negative. 
BVS is book value of equity per share. Following Ohlson (1995) and Barth et al. (1999), 
we expect coefficient βଵଵ to be positive.   
2.3.2 Identifying suspect firms 
We refer to firms with signals of having engaged in accrual-based earnings 
management or real activities management to sustain five years of consecutive earnings 
increases as suspect firms. We consider suspect firms those with (a) five years of 
consecutive earnings increases that present discretionary accruals (in any of the five 
years) that, if not included in the earnings of the corresponding year, would fail to report 
the pattern of increasing earnings, or (b) five years of consecutive earnings increases 
that engage in inefficient operational practices with the objective of managing earnings, 
and that would have broken the pattern of increasing earnings in any of the five years 
in the absence of those inefficient operational practices. 
2.3.2.1 Identification of firms suspected of accrual-based earnings management 
We use an indicator variable	SUSPECT_ACCR5୧,୲ taking the value of 1 if firm i’s 
earnings without discretionary accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings 
during any of the five years of the stream, and 0 otherwise. We define an interaction 
term	DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_ACCR5୧,୲ that takes value 1 if earnings beaters (firms with 
a five-year pattern of increasing earnings) would fail to report the earnings pattern in 
the absence of discretionary accruals in the reported earnings, and 0 otherwise. We 
obtain earnings without discretionary accruals by subtracting the abnormal accruals 
from the reported earnings, in which abnormal accruals are the difference between 
actual accruals and fitted normal accruals estimated using the Jones (1991) model.  
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The Jones (1991) model we use to estimate the normal level of accruals is as follows: 
்஺೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
௉௉ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧		                  (2) 
where TAi,t (Total accruals) is measured as income before extraordinary items, NIBE, 
minus cash flows from operations, CFO, (COMPUSTAT #18 – #308). The variable 
∆SALE୧,୲ is the change in sales revenues and PPE୧,୲ is firm’s gross property, plant, and 
equipment (COMPUSTAT #7). All variables are scaled by lagged total assets, Ai,t-1 
(COMPUSTAT #6). A higher value of abnormal total accruals implies that managers 
are more likely to engage in income-increasing earnings management.  
2.3.2.2 Identification of firms suspected of real earnings management 
Firms suspected of having engaged in real activities management to achieve a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings are those firms that undertake inefficient operating 
practices with the objective of avoiding breaking the pattern of increasing earnings. 
Following prior studies by Dechow et al. (1998) and Roychowdhury (2006), we 
consider three strategies of real activities management: accelerating sales on credit 
beyond whatever is advisable by common practice, producing more goods than 
necessary and the opportunistic reduction of discretionary expenses.  
Sales manipulation 
We create an indicator variable SUSPECT_SALE5୧,୲ that takes value of 1 if firm i’s 
earnings without the influence of sales manipulation are less than previous year’s actual 
earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. We use an interaction 
indicator DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_SALE5୧,୲  taking value 1 if earnings beaters fail to 
maintain a five-year pattern of increasing earnings when the effect of sales manipulation 
is not included in the calculation of earnings, and 0 otherwise. We generate earnings 
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without the effect of sales manipulation by adding abnormal CFO to the reported 
earnings. The abnormal CFO is actual CFO minus the CFO that one would expect given 
sales. 
Following Dechow et al. (1998), Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008), Bartov 
and Cohen (2009) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we express normal CFO from sales 
as a linear function of sales and the change in sales. Firms can accelerate sales to 
increase current earnings by offering price discounts or more lenient credit terms. The 
increased sales as a result of the price discounts and lenient credit terms are likely to 
disappear once the prices revert to the old ones. Such sales manipulation leads to higher 
current earnings when the sales are booked and margins are positive, however, it leads 
to lower current CFO given the normal sales levels (Roychowdhury, 2006). To estimate 
normal CFO, we run the following cross-sectional regression for each industry-year: 
஼ிை೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                  (3) 
where CFO୧,୲ is cash flows from operation (COMPUSTAT #308). A more negative 
value of abnormal CFO implies that managers are more likely to engage in sales 
manipulation to increase earnings.  
Overproduction 
We construct an indicator variable SUSPECT_PROD5୧,୲  that equals 1 if firm i’s 
earnings without the effect of overproduction are less than previous year’s actual 
earnings during any of the five years, and 0 otherwise. We create an interaction term 
DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_PROD5୧,୲ taking value of 1 if earnings beaters break a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings when the effect of overproduction is not included in 
earnings, and 0 otherwise.  
27 
 
Overproduction takes place when managers produce more goods than needed to 
report lower cost of goods sold (COGS) and therefore to increase current earnings. To 
capture and quantify overproduction, we estimate normal production costs using the 
following regression (e.g., Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and 
Zarowin, 2010; Chen et al., 2010; Gunny 2010; Zang, 2012):	
௉ோை஽೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙଷ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߙସ ൬
∆ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟షభ
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧   (4) 
where PRODi,t is production costs defined as the sum of COGSi,t (COMPUSTAT #44) 
and change in inventory (COMPUSTAT #3) during the year. The abnormal production 
costs are the difference between actual production costs and normal production costs. 
A higher value of abnormal production costs implies that managers are more likely to 
overproduce to increase earnings. We subtract abnormal production costs from earnings 
to obtain earnings without the effect of overproduction. 
Discretionary expenses management (opportunistic decreases in discretionary 
expenses) 
An indicator variable SUSPECT_DIXP5୧,୲ equals 1 if firm i’s earnings without the 
influence of opportunistic decreases in discretionary expenses are less than previous 
year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, and 0 otherwise. We create an 
interaction term DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ SUSPECT_DIXP5୧,୲ that takes value 1 if earnings beaters 
break a five-year pattern of increasing earnings when the effect of discretionary 
expenses management is not included in earnings, and 0 otherwise.  
Discretionary expenses are generally expensed in the period when they are incurred; 
however, firms can opportunistically reduce current discretionary expenses to inflate 
current earnings. We estimate normal levels of discretionary expenses using the 
following model (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 
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2010): 
஽ூ௑௉೔,೟
஺೔,೟షభ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ൬
ଵ
஺೔,೟షభ൰ ൅ ߙଶ ൬
ௌ஺௅ா೔,೟షభ
஺೔,೟షభ ൰ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                            (5) 
where DIXPi,t is discretionary expenses, including R&D (COMPUSTAT #46), selling, 
general and administrative expenses (COMPUSTAT #189) and advertising expenses 
(COMPUSTAT #45). The abnormal discretionary expenses are the difference between 
actual discretionary expenses and normal discretionary expenses estimated with 
equation (5). We calculate earnings without the effect of discretionary expenses 
management by adding abnormal discretionary expenses to the reported earnings. 
   
2.4 Sample, Descriptive Statistics and Results 
2.4.1 Sample 
Our initial sample consists of all available firms on the annual industrial and research 
COMPUSTAT North America databases between 1990 and 2007, excluding regulated 
firms (SIC codes between 4400 and 4999), and banks and financial institutions (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999). We require at least fifteen observations for each 
industry-year to perform cross-sectional regressions to estimate normal levels of 
accruals and operational activities (Roychowdhury, 2006; Zang, 2012). We drop 
observations with missing data of income before extraordinary items and/or number of 
common shares outstanding are missing. A few observations of EPS take on extreme 
values, so we eliminate the upper and lower 1% of the EPS for each year (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997). This finally yields a sample of 83,443 firm-year observations from 
1990 to 2007. This is the starting data set we use to estimate normal levels of total 
accruals in equation (2), and normal levels of the three types of real activities in 
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equations (3), (4) and (5).2 We employ, though, restricted subsets in our main tests. 
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 Panel A presents the number of firms with different patterns of increasing 
positive earnings and cash flows from 1990 to 2007. Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A show 
the number of firms reporting different patterns of increasing positive earnings and 
different patterns of increasing positive cash flows. The number of firms with earnings 
patterns and cash flow patterns decreases with the length of patterns. More firms report 
a one-year pattern of increasing cash flows than a one-year pattern of increasing 
earnings. However, there are more firms reporting consecutive earnings increases than 
cash flow increases from a two-year pattern to a twelve-year pattern. Besides, the 
number of firms reporting cash flow patterns decreases more rapidly with the length of 
patterns than the number of firms reporting earnings patterns. This is preliminary 
evidence that firms mainly use earnings, but not cash flows, to signal to the market that 
their business follows a stable growth trend. This is in line with a survey study 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005, p.49), showing that Chief Financial Officers think 
earnings volatility matters more than cash flow volatility because “the market becomes 
more skeptical of underlying cash flows when earnings are volatile.” Executives believe 
that a firm is perceived as riskier by the market when it has more volatile earnings than 
another firm even if these two firms have the same cash flow volatility (Graham et al., 
2005). This evidence is also in line with managers using additional tools such as 
accruals and/or operational activities to sustain their consecutive increases in earnings. 
Column 4 presents the number of firms that have the same patterns of increasing 
positive earnings and increasing positive cash flows. The number decays at a rate higher 
                                                      
2 We estimate normal levels of total accruals and operating activities cross-sectionally with at least 
fifteen observations for each two-digit SIC industry-year between 1990 and 2007. 
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than 50% with the length of patterns. 
To carry out our tests on whether market participants reward differently firms in line 
with their means of achieving a five-year pattern of increasing earnings, we first 
constrain the sample to firms with at least five years of earnings history and 39,275 
profit- and loss-making firm-year observations remain. We require profit-making firms 
for our estimation sample, and this criterion eliminates 14,129 observations of negative 
earnings, yielding 25,146 observations. We further require an identical sample 
throughout all our tests to avoid empirical results varying across estimation models, and 
this requirement eliminates 2,541 observations, which yields our final sample of 22,605 
profit-making firm-year observations between 1995 and 2007, from which 2,088 
observations correspond to firms with a five-year pattern of earnings increases. 
In Panel B, we show that from the 2,088 firm-year observations with a five-year 
pattern of consecutive increases in earnings, we classify 368 (18%) as non-suspect. That 
is, 368 firm-year observations also present a five year pattern of consecutive increases 
in cash flows. Also, from the 2,088 firms with the stream, 396, 251, 616 and 1,015 are 
suspected of having fabricated the stream through accruals management, sales 
manipulation, overproduction, and the manipulation of discretionary expenses, 
respectively. In Panel C we also show the correlation matrix between the non-suspect 
and the four types of suspect firms. All the suspect measures are correlated, which is 
indicative of firms using several types of earnings management at the same time. The 
largest correlation (44%) corresponds to suspect firms of overproduction and of the 
manipulation of discretionary expenses. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics based on the sample for which we report 
regression results. Table 2 also presents means for earnings beaters (firms with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings) and non-earnings beaters (firms without a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings) separately, and t-tests for differences in means across the 
two subsamples. Specifically, earnings beaters have significantly higher share price, 
earnings, EPS and CFO than non-earnings beaters. Non-earnings beaters have 
significantly lower sales, total assets, market capitalization and ratio of market value of 
equity to book value of equity than earnings beaters.  
Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets (TA/A) are similar for earnings beaters 
and for non-earnings beaters and not significantly different. CFO scaled by lagged total 
assets (CFO/A) is 0.16 for earnings beaters versus 0.12 for non-earnings beaters, and 
the difference is significant. The value of production costs scaled by lagged total assets 
(PROD/A) is 1.15 for the earnings beaters and it is significantly higher than scaled 
production costs for non-earnings beaters (0.99). The scaled discretionary expenses 
(DIXP/A) are not significantly different across the two subsamples. In addition, 
earnings beaters have significant higher growth in book value of equity (Growth5) and 
lower financial risk (Leverage) than non-earnings beaters.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents Pearson correlations between various variables. Share price (PRICE) 
exhibits strong positive correlation with earnings, EPS, CFO, scaled CFO, abnormal 
CFO (Ab_CFO/A), Growth5 and BVS, and significantly negative correlation with 
32 
 
scaled production costs, scaled discretionary expenses, abnormal production costs 
(Ab_PROD/A) and Leverage. Consistent with prior studies, earnings are positively 
correlated with CFO (0.93) and scaled CFO (0.03), and negatively correlated with 
scaled production costs, scaled discretionary expenses and Leverage. EPS is negatively 
correlated with abnormal production costs. As expected, the scaled CFO and scaled 
total accruals exhibit a strong negative correlation, with a correlation coefficient of -
0.96.  
The correlation between abnormal accruals (Ab_TA/A) and abnormal CFO is 
significantly negative (-0.11). This is probably because accrual-based earnings 
management and sales manipulation take place simultaneously (Roychowdhury, 2006; 
Zang, 2012). The correlation coefficient between abnormal production costs and 
abnormal discretionary expenses (Ab_DIXP/A) is significantly negative (-0.33). This 
is, probably, because managers engage in overproduction, leading to abnormally high 
production costs; meanwhile, they reduce discretionary expenses when the common 
goal is to report higher earnings (Roychowdhury, 2006).  
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
2.4.3 Empirical results 
We estimate equation (1) using standard errors clustered by firm and year to control 
for serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009) for 22,605 profit-
making firm-year observations from 1995 to 2007.3 We include year and industry 
                                                      
3 We also estimate equation (1) using White (1980) standard errors. Results are very similar. The t-
statistics are greater if we use White (1980) standard errors rather than Petersen (2009) standard errors, 
but inferences do not change.  
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dummies to control for fixed effects.  
Table 4 reports the regression-based tests of hypothesis H1 regarding whether 
investors assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters (firms with five-
year patterns both in earnings increases and cash flow increases). The first Column 
shows baseline results of basic price-earnings multiples and other factors that theory 
suggests and prior empirical work has shown to have significant effects on share price. 
The results are consistent with our predictions regarding significantly positive 
coefficients on growth of book value of equity (EPS ∗ Growth5) (4.993, t = 2.88) and 
on book value of equity per share (BVS) (1.258, t = 3.60), and significantly negative 
coefficients on earnings variability (EPS ∗ Evar) (0, t = -1.80) and leverage (EPS ∗
Leverage) (-2.481, -5.98). Column 2 shows that the coefficient on the variable EPS ∗
DBEAT5 is significantly positive (2.940, t = 4.51), consistent with Barth et al. (1999) 
that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings have higher price-earnings 
multiples than other firms.4 In Column 3 the price-earnings multiple of DBEAT5 is 
2.398 (t = 3.86) and the price-earnings multiple of the interaction term DBEAT5 ∗
DCFO5 is 3.696 (t = 2.74), indicating that market participants add additional rewards 
to non-suspect beaters, consistent with our hypothesis H1.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 5 shows regression results of whether investors assign lower price-earnings 
multiples to firms that engage in several earnings management types to create the 
                                                      
4 Although a five-year pattern is an arbitrary choice, untabulated tests show that market participants also 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms that have consecutive patterns of earnings increases from 
two years through eleven years.  
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earnings stream. Column 1 in Panel A shows that the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 is 
significantly positive (3.483, t = 4.70), meaning that market participants assign higher 
price-earnings multiple to firms with a string of five consecutive years of earnings 
increases. The coefficient on 	EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗ SUSPECT_ACCR5  is significantly 
negative (-2.203, t = -2.85), indicating that market participants assign lower price-
earnings ratios to suspected firms that fail to maintain the five years of consecutive 
increases in earnings if discretionary total accruals are not included in earnings, which 
is consistent with hypothesis H2 (a).5 Column 2 shows that the coefficient on earnings 
beaters is 3.551 (t = 4.59) and that the interaction term EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
SUSPECT_SALE5 is significantly negative (-3.821, t = -3.46), meaning that market 
participants penalize suspect firms that would have broken the pattern of increasing 
earnings if the effect of sales manipulation on earnings were not considered, consistent 
with hypothesis H2 (b). Column 3 shows that market participants reward earnings 
beaters (3.418, t = 4.40) and the coefficient on the interaction term EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
SUSPECT_PROD5  is significantly negative (-1.584, t = 2.12), consistent with our 
hypothesis H2 (b) that firms that overproduce to avoid breaking the earnings trend have 
lower price-earnings multiples than the rest of benchmark beating firms. In Column 4 
the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗ SUSPECT_DIXP5 is insignificant (-0.325, t = -
0.33), implying that market participants do not penalize firms that opportunistically 
reduce discretionary expenses to achieve the earnings pattern, which is inconsistent 
with our hypothesis H2 (b).  
Given that the different sets of suspect observations are correlated with each other 
and this could be introducing problems of correlated omitted variables, we estimate 
                                                      
5 This result also holds if we use discretionary working capital accruals. 
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equation (1) including all earnings management proxies at the same time. Table 5 Panel 
B presents regressions including all the dummy variables to identify suspect firms at 
the same time. Column 1 in Panel B shows that earnings beaters are rewarded (4.092, t 
= 4.62), and that market participants reduce price-earnings multiples to suspect firms 
that have managed total accruals (-2.197, t = -2.69) and sales (-3.816, t = -3.47) to 
increase earnings. Column 2 shows that market participants reward earnings beaters 
(3.864, t = 4.56), and reduce price-earnings multiples to suspect firms that use accrual-
based earnings management (-2.050, t = -2.68) together with overproduction (-1.385, t 
= -1.82). Column 3 shows that price-earnings multiples are lower for suspect firms that 
employ accrual-based earnings management (-2.214, t = -3.08), but not for firms with 
opportunistic decreases in discretionary expenses (0.048, t = 0.05). Finally, Column 4 
shows that market participants do not reduce rewards to firms suspected of 
overproduction (-1.008, t = -1.48) when we consider all types of earnings management. 
This result could be explained by the overlapping classification of different types of 
suspect firms.  
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
We carry out an additional test to check whether the results in Table 5 Panel A do not 
vary when the proxy for non-suspect beaters is also included in the models. Table 6 
contains regression results of market rewards on earnings beaters, non-suspect beaters 
and each type of suspect firms. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5  is 3.567 (t = 2.61) and the coefficient on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
SUSPECT_ACCR5 is -2.050 (t = -2.66), implying that market participants assign higher 
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price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and lower price-earnings multiples to 
suspect firms that manage accruals. Column 2 reports that the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5  is 3.114 (t = 2.44) and the coefficient on 	EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
SUSPECT_SALE5  is -3.298 (t = -3.16), indicating that market participants assign 
additional price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and reduces price-earnings 
multiples to suspect firms that use sales manipulation to report a pattern of increasing 
earnings. Column 3 shows that market participants assign higher rewards to non-
suspect beaters (3.570, t = 2.66) and penalize suspect firms that overproduce to avoid 
breaking the earnings pattern (-1.389, t = -1.83). Column 4 shows that the coefficient 
on EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗ DCFO5  is 3.728 (t = 2.73) and the coefficient on EPS ∗
DBEAT5 ∗ SUSPECT_DIXP5 is insignificant (-1.389, t = -1.83), indicating that market 
participants do not penalize suspect firms that reduce discretionary expenses 
opportunistically to avoid breaking the earnings trend. The regression results in Table 
6 are consistent with the preceding findings in Tables 4 and 5 that market participants 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters and lower price-earnings 
multiples to suspect firms that would have broken a five-year pattern of increasing 
earnings if discretionary accruals, the effects of sales manipulation or the effects of 
overproduction were not included in the reported earnings.6 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
2.5 Robustness Tests 
                                                      
6 We repeat the analysis excluding BVS. Our main inferences do not change. 
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To verify the robustness of our main findings, we repeat the tests of hypotheses H1, 
H2 (a) and H2 (b) using (1) a sample of 39,275 profit- and loss-making firm-year 
observations, and (2) a sample of 2,088 firms with a pattern of five-year earnings 
increases.  
The results with the sample of 39,275 profit- and loss- making firm-year observations 
(EPS൒0 and EPS<0) are not qualitatively different from our main results. Following 
Francis et al. (2003), we control for the effect of loss-making firm-year observations 
using an indicator variable,	DLOSS୧,୲, taking the value of 1 if firm i’s earnings in year 
t is less than 0, and 0 otherwise. Unreported results show that earnings beaters are 
rewarded throughout all model specifications and non-suspect beaters are valued higher 
than the rest of earnings pattern beating firms. The results also show that market 
participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to firms suspected of having used 
accrual-based earnings management, sales manipulation or overproduction to achieve 
a five-year pattern of increasing earnings.  
Second, we repeat the test for hypotheses H1, H2(a) and H2(b) using a sample of 
firms meeting or beating prior year earnings for five years (DBEAT5 ൌ 1), which left 
2,088 firm-year observations. The results are consistent with the evidence previously 
reported in our main tests that non-suspect beaters have higher price-earnings multiples 
and that suspect firms that manage discretionary accruals, sales and production have 
lower price-earnings multiples than the rest of earnings pattern beating firms. 
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper we analyze whether market rewards to firms with patterns of 
consecutive increases in earnings differ according to whether the firm is either non-
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suspect or suspect of having managed earnings to fabricate the stream. As a signal that 
the earnings stream is genuine we look at whether the firm also reports a pattern of 
increases in cash flows. We classify firms with a stream of increases in both earnings 
and cash flows as non-suspect beaters, and find that market rewards linked to the stream 
of earnings increases are more pronounced for these non-suspect beaters. 
We also analyze whether market participants penalize firms suspected of fabricating 
the earnings stream, either through accrual-based earnings management or through the 
manipulation of real activities. We find that market participants assign lower price-
earnings multiples to firms suspected of using accrual-based earnings management to 
achieve a five-year pattern of increasing earnings. Our results also show that market 
participants penalize firms that increase credit sales beyond whatever is advisable by 
common practice or overproduce to reduce cost of goods sold, to achieve the pattern of 
increasing earning. However, market participants do not penalize firms that achieve the 
earnings pattern through opportunistic reductions in discretionary expenses, including 
R&D, advertising, and selling, general and administrative expenses. 
While we expected firms that opportunistically reduce discretionary expenses to be 
penalized, our empirical results about the opportunistic reduction of discretionary 
expenses are consistent with those in Bhojraj et al. (2009) that firms that meet analysts’ 
forecasts through real earnings management are not immediately punished in the market. 
Whether this result can be attributed to real earnings management being informative 
about improved future performance (as suggested by Gunny, 2010), to the expectation 
game described in Stein (1989) that will again identify firms that maintain the stream, 
regardless of how they do it, as enjoying a better financial situation than the rest, or to 
the limited attention argument discussed by Daniel et al. (2002) and Hirshleifer and 
Teoh (2003), or other market imperfections, is something that we do not tackle in the 
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present study, but that should be the object of future research. An alternative 
explanation for this result is that the proxy that we use to capture opportunistic 
decreases in discretionary expenses could be noisy and not used in practice by financial 
analysts. 
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Appendix  
Variable Descriptions and Definitions 
PRICE Close price – fiscal year end (#199) 
Earnings NIBE, net income before extraordinary items (#18) 
EPS net income before extraordinary items divided by 
number of shares outstanding for basic EPS ( #54) 
DBEAT5 An indicator variable equals to 1 if a firm reports a 5-
year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 
otherwise 
CFO Cash flow from operations (#308) 
DCFO5 An indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year 
pattern of increasing cash flows, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*DCFO5 An interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports 5-year patterns both in earnings increases and in 
cash flows increases, and 0 otherwise 
A Total assets (#6) 
Total Accruals the difference between net income before extraordinary 
items (#18) and cash flows from operations (#308) 
divided by lagged total assets (#6) 
PPE Firm’s gross property, plant, and equipment, 
COMPUSTAT #7 
Ab_TA the level of abnormal total accruals computed using the 
Jones Model 
SUSPECT_ACCR5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without 
discretionary accruals (abnormal total accruals 
multiplied by lagged total assets) are less than previous 
year’s actual earnings during any of the five years, and 0 
otherwise 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a 
firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings 
presents discretionary total accruals that, if not included 
in earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing 
earnings, and 0 otherwise 
Sales Net sales ( #12) 
Ab_CFO the level of abnormal cash flows from operations 
computed using equation (3) 
D_RM_SALES5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without 
sales management (abnormal CFO multiplied by lagged 
total assets) are less than previous year’s actual earnings 
during any of the five years, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a 
firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails 
to maintain the pattern when the influence of sales 
management is not included in earnings, and 0 otherwise
COG Cost of goods sold (#41) 
INVT Inventory (#3) 
PROD Production cost = COGS (#41) + INVT (#3) 
Ab_PROD the level of abnormal production costs computed using 
equation (4) 
SUSPECT_PROD5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without 
production management (abnormal production costs 
multiplied by total assets) are less than previous year’s 
actual earnings during any of the five years, and 0 
otherwise 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a 
firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails 
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to maintain the pattern when production management is 
not included in earnings, and 0 otherwise 
R&D R&D expenses (#46) 
SGA Selling, general and administrative expenses (#189) 
Advertising Advertising expenses (#45) 
Discretionary Expenses  R&D (#46) + SGA (#189) + Advertising (#45)  
Ab_DIXP the level of abnormal discretionary expenses 
D_RM_ADIXP5 An indicator variable takes value of 1 if earnings without 
the influence of expenses management (abnormal 
discretionary expenses multiplied by total assets) are less 
than previous year’s actual earnings during any 
consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 An interaction indicator variable takes value of 1 if a 
firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails 
to maintain the pattern when the influence of 
discretionary expense management is not included in 
earnings, and 0 otherwise 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_REV5 An interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports a five-year pattern of increasing earnings but not 
a five-year pattern of increasing sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Leverage The sum of short-term debt (#34) and long-term debt 
(#9) divided by market capitalization(#199*#25) 
Evar Variance of the past five years’ percentage change in 
earnings ሺNIBE୧,୲ െ NIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ/absሺNIBE୧,୲ିଵ) 
Growth5 Five-year compound annual growth rate of book value of 
equity (#60), (BVt/BVt-6)1/5-1 
BVS Book value of equity per share (#60/# 54). 
 
All variables are in millions of dollars except number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(#54), which units are millions. 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Number of Firms Reporting Patterns of Positive Earnings Increases, Positive 
CFO Increases and Both in Positive Earnings and Positive CFO Increases
Num. of 
Years 
Num. of  
Earnings Beaters 
Num. of  
CFO Beaters 
Num. of Non-suspect Beaters  
(% over Earnings Beaters) 
1 21995 22468 12791 (0.58) 
2 11369 9162 4428 (0.39) 
3 6292 4070   1806(0.29) 
4 3601 1973 813 (0.23) 
5 2088 993 368 (0.18) 
6 1246 535 189(0.15) 
7 767 291 105(0.14) 
8 484 157 61(0.13) 
9 313 82 33 (0.11) 
10 203 41 14(0.07) 
11 136 19 3(0.02) 
12 95 9 0(0) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). CFO = cash flows from 
operations (Compustat #308). 
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Table 1  
Panel B: Number and Percentages of Non-suspect Beaters and Suspect Firms for a five Year Stream of Consecutive Earnings Increases 
Earnings Beaters    Non-suspect Suspect (Accruals) Suspect (Sales)   Suspect (Overprod.) Suspect (Disc. Exp.) 
2088  368 (18%) 396 (19%) 251 (12%) 616 (30%) 1015 (49%) 
 
Table 1 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix between Non-suspect Beaters and the Four Types of Suspects Firms 
 Non-suspect  Suspect (accruals) Suspect (sales) Suspect (overprod.) 
Suspect (accruals) 0.13 **    
Suspect (sales) 0.01  0.12 **   
Suspect (overprod.) 0.13 ** 0.26 ** 0.28 **  
Suspect (disc. expenses) 0.25 ** 0.39 ** 0.19 ** 0.44 ** 
 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables  
Full Sample, 1995-2007  
(n = 22,605) 
 Earnings Beaters 
(n = 2,088) 
Non-earnings Beaters 
(n = 20,517) 
t-statistic 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Mean (Diff. in Mean) 
PRICE 19.072 14.20 22.56 27.50 18.22 18.05***
Earnings 214.74 19.23 981.01 480.58 187.69 13.05***
EPS 1.04 0.74 1.10 1.46 0.99 18.69***
CFO 368.42 30.94 1622.97 720.10 332.51 10.42***
Total Accruals -153.78 -9.11 793.16 -236.69 -145.31 -5.00***
Sales 3259.81 390.58 12921.84 6582.32 2921.68 12.37***
Total Assets 3440.72 349.77 17648.40 7291.31 3048.86 10.24***
Market Capitalization 4517.63 393.84 19808.96 11384.65 3816.87 16.73***
Market to Book 3.17 2.08 12.94 4.42 3.04 4.65***
TA/A -0.03 -0.04 0.27 -0.03 -0.03 0.44
CFO/A 0.12 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.12 7.62***
PROD/A 1.01 0.80 0.96 1.15 0.99 6.87***
DIXP/A 0.35 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.35 1.04
Ab_TA/A 0.08 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.08 -4.27***
Ab_CFO/A 0.12 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.12 4.63***
Ab_PROD/A 0.03 -0.06 0.62 -0.03 0.04 -4.94***
Ab_DISEXP/A -0.13 -0.10 0.30 -0.16 -0.13 -4.34***
Leverage 0.39 0.15 1.07 0.17 0.41 -9.83***
Evar 945.35 1.54 32101.12 10.21 1040.52 -1.397
Ggrowth5 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.27 0.16 21.50***
BVS 8.43 6.47 8.85 8.13 8.09 0.20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of observations: 22,605 firm-year observations during 1995-2007. */**/*** indicate Significance at the 10%/5% /1% .  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). EPS 
= net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). CFO = cash flows from 
operations (Compustat #308). Total Accruals = the difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations. 
Sales = net sales (Compustat #12). Total Assets = Compustat #6). Market capitalization = close price per share times the number of common 
shares outstanding (Compustat #25). Market to Book = the market capitalization divided by the book value of common equity (Compustat  
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Table 2 (continued)  
 #60). TA/A = total accruals divided by lagged total assets. CFO/A = cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets. PROD/A = 
Production costs divided by lagged total assets, where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat #41) and the 
change in inventories (Compustat #3). DIXP/A = Discretionary expenses divided by lagged total assets, where discretionary expenses are the 
sum of R&D expenses (Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat #45) and SGA expenses (Compustat #189). Ab_TA/A = the 
discretionary total accruals computed using the Jones Model. Ab_CFO/A = the level of abnormal cash flows from operations computed using 
equation (3). Ab_PROD/A = the level of abnormal production costs computed using equation (4). Ab_DIXP/A = the level of abnormal 
discretionary expenses computed using equation (5). Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) 
divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5= 5-year compound growth rate of 
book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix among Key Variables  
 
 
 
 
 Firm characteristics Earnings management proxies Controls 
 PRICE Earnings EPS CFO TA/A CFO/A PROD/A DIXP/A Ab TA/A Ab CFO/A Ab PROD/A Ab DIXP/A Leverage Evar Growth5 
Earnings  0.21** 1      
EPS 0.62** 0.27** 1     
CFO 0.20** 0.93** 0.23** 1     
TA/A -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.03** 1     
CFO/A 0.04** 0.03** 0.05** 0.03** -0.96** 1     
PROD/A -0.08** -0.06** 0.01 -0.07** 0.03** -0.02 1     
DIXP/A -0.08** -0.06** -0.16** -0.08** 0.02 0.04** 0.13 1     
Ab_TA/A -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02** -0.27** -0.18** -0.03** 0.05**       1    
Ab_CFO/A 0.06** 0.07** -0.02 0.07** -0.13** 0.20** -0.27** 0.07** -0.11** 1   
Ab_PROD/A -0.09** -0.06** -0.03** -0.07** 0.02 -0.03** 0.71** -0.01 0.03** -0.25** 1   
Ab_DIXP/A -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04** 0.05** -0.16** 0.48 0.03** -0.26** -0.33** 1   
Leverage -0.10** -0.03** -0.03** 0.01 0.01 -0.06** 0.05** -0.11** -0.01 -0.12** 0.02 -0.00 1   
Evar -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 1   
Growth5 0.10** 0.01 0.03** -0.00 -0.00 0.04** -0.02 -0.03** -0.01 0.10** -0.09** -0.03** -0.09** 0.11 1 
BVS 0.69** 0.09** 0.60** 0.11** -0.01 -0.03** -0.03** -0.20** -0.04** -0.09** -0.06** -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05** 
Number of observations: 22,605 firm-year observations during 1995-2007. ** represents the correlation coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). CFO = cash flows from operations (Compustat #308). TA/A = total accruals 
divided by lagged total assets. CFO/A = cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets. PROD/A = Production costs divided by lagged total assets, where 
production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat #41) and the change in inventories (Compustat #3). DIXP/A = Discretionary expenses divided by 
lagged total assets, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses (Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat # 45) and SGA expenses (Compustat 
#189). Ab_TA/A = the discretionary total accruals computed using the Jones Model. Ab_CFO/A = the level of abnormal cash flows from operations computed using equation 
(3). Ab_PROD/A = the level of abnormal production costs computed using equation (4), where production costs are defined as the sum of cost of goods sold (Compustat 
#41) and the change in inventories (Compustat #3). Ab_DIXP/A = the level of abnormal discretionary expenses, where discretionary expenses are the sum of R&D expenses 
(Compustat #46), advertising expenses (Compustat #45) and SGA expenses (Compustat #189) . Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat # 34) and long-term debt 
(Compustat # 9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value 
of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 4 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-suspect Beaters (Firms with Five-year 
Patterns of Increasing Earnings and Increasing Cash Flows)
N=22,605   1 2 3 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.061
(0.99) 
1.057
(0.97) 
1.047
(0.96) 
EPS + 6.228
(3.73)
***
 
5.749
(3.37)
**
 
5.756
(3.37)
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5 +  2.940
(4.51)
***
 
2.398
(3.86)
***
EPS*DBEAT5*DCFO5 +  3.696
(2.74)
**
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.993
(2.88)
***
 
4.792
(2.46)
**
 
4.741
(2.40)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.481
(-5.98)
***
 
-2.389
(-5.80)
*** -2.382
(-5.80)
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.80)
*
 
-0.000
(-1.59) 
-0.000
(-1.58) 
BVS + 1.258
(3.60)
***
 
1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.280
(3.65)
***
R-Squared   0.574 0.579 0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses 
are based on firm and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance 
at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = 
net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding 
for basic EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise. DCFO5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing 
positive cash flows, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DCFO5 = interaction indicator 
variable equals 1 if a firm reports five-year patterns both in earnings increases 
and in cash flows increases, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt 
(Compustat # 34) and long-term debt (Compustat # 9) divided by market 
capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. 
Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book 
value of equity per share. 
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Table 5  
Analysis of Market Rewards to Suspect Firms  
Panel A: Having Used Each Type of Earnings Management to Achieve the Earnings Pattern 
N=22,605   1     2     3     4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.024
(0.94) 
1.034
(0.94) 
1.051
(0.96)
 
 
1.059
(0.97)
 
 
EPS + 5.751
(3.37)
***
 
5.736
(3.36)
***
 
5.757
(3.37)
*** 
 
5.748
(3.36)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 3.483
(4.70)
***
 
3.551
(4.59)
***
 
3.418
(4.40)
*** 
 
3.088
(3.27)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 - -2.203
(-2.85)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5 -  -3.821
(-3.46)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 -  -1.584
(-2.12)
** 
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 -  
  -0.325
(-0.33)
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.787
(2.45)
**
 
4.801
(2.48)
**
 
4.756
(2.42)
** 
 
4.785
(2.46)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.377
(-5.78)
*** -2.369
(-5.84)
***
 
-2.392
(-5.82)
*** 
 
-2.389
(-5.80)
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.58) 
-0.000
(-1.58) 
-0.000
(-1.59)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.59)
 
 
BVS + 1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.282
(3.66)
***
 
1.279
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.279
(3.65)
***
 
R-Squared  0.579 0.580 0.579 0.579
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Table 5 (continued) 
Panel B: Having Used Multiple Types of Earnings Management to Achieve the Earnings Pattern 
N=22,605   1 2 3 4 
Variable Predicted
 Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept 
     
? 1.001
(0.91) 
1.021
(0.93) 
1.023
(0.94)
 
 
1.003
(0.91)
 
 
EPS + 5.738
(3.36)
***
 
5.758
(3.37)
***
 
5.751
(3.37)
*** 
 
5.742
(3.36)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 4.092
(4.62)
***
 
3.864
(4.56)
***
 
3.464
(3.54)
*** 
 
4.491
(3.43)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 - -2.197
(-2.69)
*** -2.050
(-2.68)
***
 
-2.214
(-3.08)
*** 
 
-2.011
(-2.73)
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5 - -3.816
(-3.47)
***  -3.750
(-2.98)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 - -1.385
(-1.82)
*
 
 -1.008
(-1.48)
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 - 0.048
(0.05)
 
 
-0.330
(-0.32)
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.796
(2.47)
**
 
4.756
(2.42)
**
 
4.788
(2.46)
** 
 
4.6766
(2.45)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.358
(-5.81)
*** -2.381
(-5.79)
***
 
-2.378
(-5.79)
*** 
 
-2.361
(-5.82)
***
 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.57)
 
 
BVS + 1.281
(3.66)
*** 1.279
(3.65)
***
 
1.279
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.282
(3.66)
***
 
R-Squared   0.580 0.580 0.579 0.581
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and 
year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 
otherwise. SUSPECT_ACCR5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of 
abnormal total accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, 
and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with 
a five-year pattern of increasing earnings presents abnormal total accruals that, if not included in 
earnings, would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_SALE5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of sales management are less than 
previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of sales management is 
removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_PROD5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings 
without the influence of production management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during 
any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 = interaction indicator 
variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern 
when the influence of production management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
SUSPECT_DIXP5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of expenses 
management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 
otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of discretionary 
expense management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt 
(Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance 
of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book 
value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 6  
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-Suspect Beaters and Suspect Firms 
N=22,605   1 2 3 4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic)
Intercept ? 1.018
(0.93) 
1.029
(0.94) 
1.043
(0.95)
 
 
1.050
(0.96)
 
 
EPS + 5.757
(3.37)
***
 
5.744
(3.36)
***
 
5.763
(3.37)
*** 
 
5.755
(3.37)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 2.923
(4.03)
**
 
3.011
(4.12)
***
 
2.836
(3.77)
*** 
 
2.601
(2.85)
***
 
EPS*DBEAT5*DCFO5 + 3.567
(2.61)
***
 
3.114
(2.44)
**
 
3.570
(2.66)
** 
 
3.728
(2.73)
**
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 - -2.050
(-2.66)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5 -  -3.298
(-3.16)
***     
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 -   -1.389(-1.83)
* 
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 -  
   -0.455
(-0.45)
 
 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.738
(2.40)
**
 
4.757
(2.43)
**
 
4.711
(2.37)
** 
 
4.731
(2.40)
**
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.371
(-5.78)
*** -2.366
(-5.84)
***
 
-2.385
(-5.81)
*** 
 
-2.381
(-5.80)
***
 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.57) 
-0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
-0.00
(-1.58)
 
 
BVS + 1.280
(3.65)
***
 
1.282
(3.66)
***
 
1.280
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.280
(3.65)
***
 
R-Squared  0.580 0.580 0.580 0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and 
year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 
= indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 
otherwise. DCFO5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive 
cash flows, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DCFO5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports five-year patterns both in earnings increases and in cash flows increases, and 0 otherwise. 
SUSPECT_ACCR5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of abnormal total 
accruals are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 
otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_ACCR5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-
year pattern of increasing earnings presents abnormal total accruals that, if not included in earnings, 
would fail to report the pattern of increasing earnings, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_SALE5 = indicator 
variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of sales management are less than previous year’s 
actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_SALE5= 
interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to 
maintain the pattern when the influence of sales management is removed from earnings, and 0 
otherwise. SUSPECT_PROD5 = indicator variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of 
production management are less than previous year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five 
years, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*SUSPECT_PROD5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a 
firm with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of 
production management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. SUSPECT_DIXP5 = indicator 
variable equals 1 if earnings without the influence of expenses management are less than previous 
year’s actual earnings during any consecutive five years, and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_DIXP5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm with a five-year pattern 
of increasing earnings fails to maintain the pattern when the influence of discretionary expense 
management is removed from earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
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Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) divided by 
market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 
5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per shares. 
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Chapter 3. The Effects of Conditional Conservatism on Market Rewards to 
Patterns of Increasing Earnings 
 
Abstract 
This study explores the effects of conditional conservatism on market rewards to firms 
that report a sequential pattern of increasing positive earnings. We expect conditional 
conservatism to increase the credibility of earnings increases. This is so as conservatism 
introduces constraints to opportunistic income-increasing earnings management (Watts, 
2003a; Guay and Verrechia, 2006; Chen et al. 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008). Using 
several measures of conditional conservatism, we show that market participants assign 
higher price-earnings multiples to firms with long streams of earnings increases when 
their accounting is more conditionally conservative. Our results hold after controlling 
for industry, year, growth opportunities, market-to-book, and firm’s financial and 
operating risks. 
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3.1 Introduction 
We empirically test whether conditional conservatism affects market rewards to firms 
that report long streams of consecutive increases in earnings. The prediction is that 
market rewards are higher for firms that exhibit a higher degree of conditional 
conservatism. Conditional conservatism is defined as the requirement of a lower degree 
of verification for the recognition of losses than for the recognition of gains in the 
financial statements, resulting in earnings reflecting bad news timelier than good news 
(Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a).7  Our study builds on the argument that conservative 
accounting serve as a governance control structure to curb managerial manipulation on 
earnings reporting (Watts, 2003a, Guay and Verrechia, 2006; LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
Recent literature provides analytical and empirical evidence consistent with 
conservatism reducing opportunistic biases in financial accounting (Chen et al., 2007; 
García Lara et al., 2012; Gao, 2013).    
Prior studies show that market participants assign higher rewards to firms that report 
a long stream of increasing earnings (e.g., Barth et al., 1999) and that managers engage 
in earnings management to maintain and extend the earnings trend (see e.g., Myers et 
al., 2007). Managers do so because of the large capital market penalties linked to 
missing an earnings benchmark (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2002), which also have a large 
effect on managerial compensation (e.g., Matsunaga and Park, 2001). 
In this paper, we study the extent to which conditional conservatism influences 
market rewards to firms that report a long stream of increasing earnings. We argue that 
conservative accounting improves the credibility of the stream of increasing earnings. 
This is so as conservatism introduces limits to income-increasing earnings management 
                                                      
7  We use the terms conditional conservatism and conservatism interchangeably throughout the paper.  
57 
 
(Watts, 2003a; Chen et al., 2007; García Lara et al., 2012; Gao, 2013). Therefore, we 
expect that market participants assign higher prices to firms with a long pattern of 
increasing earnings when the accounting of these firms is more conservative. 
 Following the definition of conservatism proposed in Basu (1997), we employ the 
following firm-year specific measures of conditional conservatism: (1) the skewness of 
earnings deflated by the skewness of cash flows, (2) accumulated nonoperating accruals 
deflated by accumulated total assets, and (3) two firm-specific measures, CScores, 
based on the work of Khan and Watts (2009). 
Using a sample of US listed non-financial, non-utility and profit-making firm-year 
observations for the period 1995-2007 obtained from COMPUSTAT, our findings show 
that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms with a five-year 
pattern of earnings increases when their accounting is more conditionally conservative. 
The result holds after controlling for growth opportunities, firm’s financial and 
operating risks, market-to-book, and leverage, which are potentially correlated with 
proxies for conditional conservatism, and with firm’s stock price. In addition, we also 
control for industry and year.  
This study contributes to the literature along several dimensions. First, we connect 
conservative accounting with a stream of research regarding market rewards to 
reporting stream of consecutive earnings increases. We are not aware of any paper that 
directly analyzes whether market rewards to firms with a long stream of increasing 
earnings differ with signals of whether the firms’ accounting is conditionally 
conservative. Our results are consistent with conservatism being a signal that investors 
can use to gauge whether the earnings stream is genuine or fabricated. Second, this 
study contributes to a stream of empirical research in accounting conservatism that 
shows conditional conservatism can lead to positive economic outcomes (LaFond and 
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Watts, 2008; García Lara et al., 2011). Finally, we provide indirect evidence that 
conditional conservatism improves the information environment of the firm by 
offsetting income-increasing earnings management in financial reporting (Chen, 2007; 
García Lara et al., 2012; Gao, 2013). We thus provide evidence that conservatism is not 
only useful in debt-contracting, but also relevant for equity holders. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a discussion 
of the related literature and describes the hypothesis. Section 3 contains the research 
design. Section 4 describes the data and the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 
summarizes the findings and concludes. 
 
3.2 Prior Research and Development of the Hypothesis 
Recent studies highlight that conservative accounting benefits users of the 
accounting reports of firms. Under the contracting explanation, conservatism appears 
to mitigate managerial opportunistic behavior by managers (Watts, 2003a; Guay and 
Verreccchia, 2006; Chen et al., 2007; LaFond and Watts, 2008), and information 
asymmetries among the contracting parties (LaFond and Watts, 2008; Khan and Watts, 
2009). Basu (1997, p.4) empirically interprets conditional conservatism as “capturing 
accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good 
news than bad news in financial statements”. It is more difficult to manipulate earnings 
since the asymmetric verification requirement of good news and bad news defers the 
recognition of gains, and on average understates current and cumulative earnings, and 
assets (Watts, 2003a). Chen et al. (2007) and Gao (2013) analytically demonstrate that 
conservatism imposes limits to managers’ opportunistic behavior. They argue this is so 
as conservatism dampens firm insiders’ incentives to manage earnings. García Lara et 
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al. (2012) study empirically the association of conservatism and earnings management 
and provide evidence that conservatism imposes limits to accrual-based earnings 
management. Building on the argument that conservatism is part of a firm’s corporate 
control mechanism, recent studies show that conservative accounting constrains over-
investment by opportunistic managers (García Lara et al., 2010), and more conservative 
firms tend to make more profitable acquisition decisions (Francis and Martin, 2010).   
LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that conservatism reduces the discount that investors 
apply to firm value when there is information asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors. Khan and Watts (2009) use event studies to show that conservatism is a 
response to increases in information asymmetry. Conservatism enables investors to 
verify the precision of earnings information provided by managers.  
Prior research argues that the conflict of interest between firms, insiders and outsiders 
induces management incentives to misrepresent the firm’s performance through 
earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003). With the extended importance of stock-based 
bonus plans, managers become more sensitive to the level of their firms’ stock prices 
and their relation to key accounting numbers, such as earnings; hence, their incentives 
to manage earnings have also increased. Managers can be inclined to fabricate a stream 
of increasing earnings because they feel that doing so the firm will receive capital 
market rewards. They might also feel inclined to sustain a long earnings trend since 
firms that end a stream of positive earnings increases suffer a larger than expected 
market penalty (e.g., Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Kinney et al., 2002), a larger than 
expected cut in managerial compensation (Matsunaga and Park, 2001).  
Shading light on the role of conditional conservatism in improving the functioning 
of capital markets, Guay and Verrecchia (2007) and Suijs (2008) analytically show that 
conditional conservatism can affect firm’s market value and its cost of capital. Li (2010) 
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and García Lara et al. (2011) show that more conditional conservatism leads to lower 
cost of capital. Li (2010) examines the association between conditional conservatism 
and cost of capital at the country level and demonstrates that firms domiciled in 
countries with more conservative financial systems have lower cost of equity and cost 
of debt.  
Prior research has not directly addressed whether market participants award higher 
rewards to firms reporting a long stream of earnings increases when the accounting of 
these firms is more conditionally conservative. Recent studies provide evidence that 
firms that report a long stream of increasing earnings enjoy higher price-earnings 
multiples (Barth et al., 1999) and positive abnormal returns (Myers et al., 2007). Given 
that prior studies find a positive association between conservatism and information 
environment, and a negative association between conservatism and earnings 
management, we contribute to prior literature by analyzing whether the capital markets 
benefits of firms with a long stream of annual are more pronounced for more 
conservative firms.  
Given the evidence that conservatism constrains earnings management and improves 
the information environment, investors can use the level of conditional conservatism as 
an indirect way to assess whether the firm is suspected of having fabricated the earnings 
pattern. If this is the case, and firms with more conservative accounting will find it more 
costly to manage earnings to fabricate the earnings stream, then conservative 
accounting can be used as a signal that there is a lower probability that the earnings 
stream is fabricated. Given this, our first hypothesis is as follows: 
H: Market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms with a 
long stream of earnings increases and more conditional conservatism, vis-à-
vis firms that report the stream but with lower conditional conservatism. 
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3.3 Research Design  
In our empirical tests, we choose a five-year pattern of increasing earnings as a cut 
off based on the results in Barth et al. (1999). The basic results of market rewards to 
earnings increases do not change when we use different lengths of patterns of earnings 
increases.  
3.3.1 Model specification 
We conduct our analysis by estimating the following linear regression model: 
ܴܲܫܥܧ௜,௧ ൌ 	 		ߚ଴ ൅ 	ߚଵ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚଶ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ 
																					൅	ߚଷ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܥܱܰܵܧܴܸܣܶܫܵܯ௜,௧ 
																					൅	ߚସ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄5,௜,௧ ൅ ߚହ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ 
																					൅	ߚ଺	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܧݒܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଻	ܤܸ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                         (1) 
Where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. ܴܲܫܥܧ is the share price at the fiscal 
year end (COMPUSTAT #199). EPS is income before extraordinary items, NIBE 
(COMPUSTAT #18), divided by number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS, 
(COMPUSTAT #54).  
Throughout our tests, to identify firms that report a pattern of increasing earnings, 
we focus on income before extraordinary items, NIBE. Equation (1) includes a dummy 
variable ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜௧  that takes value 1 if firm ݅  continuously reports increasing 
positive earnings for five years and 0 otherwise. We refer to firms with a five-year 
pattern of increasing earnings as earnings beaters. We expect that ߚଶ  is positive, 
indicating that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing positive earnings have higher 
price-earnings multiples than other firms (Barth et al., 1999). 
For the main test of whether there are additional market rewards to firms that use 
conservative accounting on the reporting of a five-year pattern of positive increasing 
earnings, we expect coefficient ߚଷ to be positive. 
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Finally, following Barth et al. (1999) we add four controls: Growth5, Leverage, Evar 
and book value of equity per share (BVS). Growth5 is the five-year compound growth 
rate of book value of equity (COMPUSTAT #60). We predict ߚସ  to be positive. 
Leverage is defined as sum of short-term debt due within one year and long-term debt, 
divided by market value of equity (COMPUSTAT #34 + COMPUSTAT #9) 
/(COMPUSTAT #199 * COMPUSTAT #25). Evar is measured as variance of the past 
five years’ percentage change in earnings, ሺNIBE௜,௧ െ NIBE௜,௧ିଵሻ/abs	ሺNIBE௜,௧ିଵሻ . 
Leverage is a measure of financial risk and Evar is a measure of operating risk. We 
expect ߚହ and ߚ଺ to be negative. BVS is book value of equity divided by number of 
shares. Following Ohlson (1995) and Barth et al. (1999), we expect coefficient ߚ଻ to 
be positive. 
3.3.2 Measures of conditional conservatism 
This paper analyzes the incremental pricing effects of conditional conservatism on 
the reporting of earnings increase over consecutive five years. Following Basu’s (1997) 
empirical definition of conditional conservatism, asymmetric recognition of gains and 
losses on reported earnings, we employ the following four measures of conditional 
conservatism.  
3.3.2.1 Conditional conservatism based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
The skewness of earnings 
Relying on the notion that asymmetric timeliness of good news and bad news in 
earnings generally reduces the cumulative earnings relative to operating cash flows over 
time, we use the negative of the skewness of earnings as a measure of conditional 
conservatism. 
Following Givoly and Hayn (2000), we develop the measure, Con_Earskew, by 
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deflating the skewness of earnings (COMPUSTAT #18) by the skewness of cash flows 
(COMPUSTAT #308), in order to control for the variation in firm performance (Zhang, 
2008). The measure is computed in a rolling five-year window to capture the association 
of conditional conservatism with a five-year pattern of increasing earnings of individual 
firms. We multiply skewness of earnings by negative one, so that the higher the 
Con_Earskew, the more conservative the firm is. 
Accumulated nonoperating accruals  
The asymmetric recognition of gains and losses over extended periods can generate 
an accumulation of negative accruals, and this is in contrast with the expected pattern 
of accrual reversals (Ahmed et al., 2002). This suggests that a firm’s cumulative 
accruals accumulated over a period provides a measure for conditional conservatism 
(Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003b). In particular, we use 
accumulated nonoperating accruals deflated by accumulated total assets over five years, 
Con_Nonaccr, as the second measure of conditional conservatism. We also multiply 
this measure by negative one, so that the higher the Con_Nonaccr, the more 
conservative the firm is. 
Following Givoly and Hayn (2000) and Zhang (2008), nonoperating accruals are 
defined as the difference between total accruals (excluding depreciation) and operating 
accruals. Total accruals = net income (COMPUSTAT #172) + depreciation 
(COMPUSTAT #14) – cash flows from operations (COMPUSTAT #308). Operating 
accruals =  accounts receivable (COMPUSTAT #2) –inventories (COMPUSTAT #3) 
+  prepaid expenses (COMPUSTAT #160) – accounts payable (COMPUSTAT #70) 
– taxes payable (COMPUSTAT #71). 
Prior literature identifies certain limitations of these two measures of conditional 
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conservatism based on the distribution of earnings and on the accumulation of accruals. 
One limitation is that these measures probably capture overall conservatism, beyond 
the scope of conditional conservatism (Ryan, 2006). Another limitation is that these 
measures also capture “big baths” that result from earnings management (Zhang, 2008). 
Therefore, we use additional measures of conditional conservatism to supplement the 
analysis. 
3.3.2.2 Conditional Conservatism based on Khan and Watts (2009) 
We construct empirical measures of the three-year average of the firm-year specific 
proxy for conditional conservatism proposed by Khan and Watts (2009). The Khan and 
Watts proxy is based on the asymmetric earnings timeliness coefficient estimates from 
Basu’s (1997) cross-sectional regressions. Khan and Watts (2009) specify the 
coefficient of conservatism as a linear function of three firm characteristics that are 
widely viewed as determinants of conservatism at the firm level: leverage, size and 
market to book (MB). Prior literature shows that debt contracting is probably the main 
determinants of conservatism (Watts, 2003a; Ball et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008, Gormley 
et al., 2013; Jayaraman and Shivakumar, 2013). Khan and Watts (2009) use leverage to 
capture debt-contracting related pressures for conservative accounting. Size is also a 
proxy for litigation and regulatory costs, which are also drivers of conservatism (see 
Watts, 2003a). Finally, the market-to-book ratio is negatively related to conditional 
conservatism. One common explanation for this is that the market-to-book ratio 
captures unconditional conservatism, which pre-empts and is negatively related to 
conditional conservatism (Beaver and Ryan, 2005). 
We estimate two variants of the Khan and Watts (2009) measure. In the first one we 
just replicate Khan and Watts (2009) and apply their method to the Basu (1997) 
earnings-return regression. In the second one, we deviate from Khan and Watts (2009) 
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and we apply their method to the model of conservatism based on the different 
persistence of positive and negative changes in earnings also proposed by Basu (1997). 
The coefficients of Basu’s (1997) earnings-returns regression 
Khan and Watts (2009) base their measure on the coefficients of Basu’s (1997) 
asymmetric timeliness cross-sectional regression of earnings on stock returns. The 
Basu’s (1997) cross-sectional regression is, 
௜ܺ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦܴ௜ ൅ ߙଶܴ௜ ൅ ߙଷܦܴ௜ ∗ ܴ௜ ൅ ݁௜                               (2) 
where i indexes the firm, X is defined as EPS (COMPUSTAT#18/#54) scaled by the 
beginning share price (COMPUSTAT #199) and R is return obtained by the change in 
share price over a one-year window scaled by lagged share price. DRi is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when R<0 and 0 otherwise. 
Basu (1997) assumes that price reflects information received from sources other than 
current earnings, and price is a leading indicator of accounting earnings. Conservative 
accounting results in earnings being timelier to the publicly available negative 
unexpected returns, capturing bad news, than positive unexpected returns, capturing 
good news (Basu, 1997). The coefficient, ߙ2, is the measure of good news timeliness, 
representing the sensitivity of earnings to positive returns. The measure of incremental 
timeliness for bad news over good news, or conditional conservatism, is ߙ3. The total 
bad news timeliness is ߙ2 + ߙ3. 
Khan and Watts (2009) specify that the timeliness of good news (hereafter, 
GScore_ret) each year and the incremental timeliness of bad news (CScore_ret) are 
linear functions of three firm-specific characteristics: size, market-to-book (MB) and 
leverage each year.  
ܩܵܿ݋ݎ݁_ݎ݁ݐ ൌ ߙଶ ൌ ߤଵ 	൅ ߤଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߤଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ߤସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜	                 (3) 
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ܥܵܿ݋ݎ݁_ݎ݁ݐ ൌ ߙଷ ൌ ଵ 	൅ ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜                 (4) 
where size is the natural log of market value of equity (COMPUSTAT #199*#54) and 
MB is the market-to-book (COMPUSTAT #199*#54/#60). Leverage is defined as the 
sum of short-term debt due within one year and long-term debt, divided by market value 
of equity ((COMPUSTAT#34 + COMPUSTAT#9) / (COMPUSTAT#199 * 
COMPUSTAT #25)). 
Khan and Watts (2009) substitute Equations (3) and (4) into the regression Equation 
(2). Then, they estimate CScore_ret using the following annual cross-sectional linear 
regression model: 
௜ܺ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܦܴ௜ ൅ ܴ௜ ∗ ሺߤଵ 	൅ ߤଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߤଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ߤସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ 
																൅	ܦܴ௜ ∗ ܴ௜ ∗ ሺଵ 	൅ ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ 
																൅	ሺߜଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߜଶܯܤ௜ ൅ ߜଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ 
									൅	ሺ	ߜସܦܴ௜ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߜହܦܴ௜ ∗ ܯܤ௜ ൅ ߜ଺ܦܴ௜ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃ሻ ൅ ݁௜           (5) 
The two measures, CScore_ret and GScore_ret, vary across firms through cross-
sectional variation in the firm-year characteristics (size, MB and Leverage), and over 
time through intertemporal variation in estimators i and i, and the firm-year 
characteristics. The empirical measure for conditional conservatism, Con_CScore_ret, 
is the three-year average of the firm-year specific proxy (CScore_ret). The higher the 
Con_CScore_ret, the more conservative the firm is. 
The coefficients of Basu’s (1997) difference of earnings persistence regression 
The second measure is based on the coefficients of the model of differences in 
earnings persistence for gains and losses proposed by Basu (1997) and also applied by 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005). Taking a different way of viewing the same phenomenon, 
Basu (1997) argues that less persistence (more timeliness) means that more current 
value relevant news is recognized contemporaneously in earnings, and more persistence 
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(less timeliness) refers to that less current value relevant news to be recognized in future 
earnings. The coefficients of timely gain and loss incorporation measure the tendency 
for increases and decreases in accounting income to reverse (Basu, 1997; Ball and 
Shivakumar, 2005). 
To identify the different persistence of gains and losses we follow Basu (1997) and 
estimate the following model: 
∆ܰܫ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ݁௜            (6) 
where ∆ܰܫ௧ is change in income from fiscal year t-1 to t, scaled by beginning total 
assets (COMPUSTAT#6). ܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if 
∆ܰܫ௧<0, and 0 otherwise. Timely recognition of economic losses implies they are 
recognized as “transitory” increases in income that tend to reverse, implying β3<0. 
To estimate a firm-year specific measure, we adapt the Khan and Watts procedure, 
and assume that the coefficients in Equation (6) are linear functions of three firm-
specific characters: Size, MB and leverage. 
ܩܵܿ݋ݎ݁_݊݅ ൌ ߚଶ ൌ ߤᇱଵ 	൅ ߤᇱଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߤᇱଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ߤᇱସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜	               (7) 
ܥܵܿ݋ݎ݁_݊݅ ൌ ߚଷ ൌ ᇱଵ 	൅ ᇱଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ᇱଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ᇱସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜                (8) 
We substitute Equations (7) and (8) into the regression Equation (6). Thus, we 
estimate CScore_ni using the following annual cross-sectional regression: 
∆ܰܫ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ൅ ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ሺߤ′ଵ 	൅ ߤ′ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߤ′ଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ߤ′ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ 
																					൅ܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ሺ′ଵ 	൅ ′ଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ′ଷܯܤ௜ ൅ ′ସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ 
																					൅ሺߜ′ଵܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߜ′ଶܯܤ௜ ൅ ߜ′ଷܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜	ሻ         
																				൅ሺ	ߜ′ସܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߜ′ହܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ܯܤ௜ሻ 
																				൅ሺ		ߜ′଺ܦ∆ܰܫ௧ିଵ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ሻ ൅ ߳௜                             (9) 
The second measure for conditional conservatism, Con_CScore_ni, is the three-year 
68 
 
average of the firm-year specific proxy for conditional conservatism (CScore_ni). The 
higher the Con_CScore_ni, the more conservative the firm is. 
 
3.4 Sample, Descriptive Statistics and Results 
3.4.1 Sample selection 
Our initial sample consists of all available firms on the annual industrial and research 
COMPUSTAT North America databases between 1990 and 2007, excluding regulated 
firms (SIC codes between 4400 and 4999) and banks and financial institutions (SIC 
codes between 6000 and 6999). We drop observations with missing data of income 
before extraordinary items and/or number of common shares outstanding. A few 
observations of EPS take on extreme values. Therefore, we eliminate the upper and 
lower 1% of the EPS for each year (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). This yields a sample 
of 83,443 firm-year observations from 1990 to 2007. To carry out our tests on whether 
market rewards to five-year stream of increasing earnings increase with conditional 
conservatism, we first constrain the sample to firms with at least five years of earnings 
history and 39,275 firm-year observations remain. We require profit-making firms for 
our estimation sample and this criterion eliminates 14,129 observations of negative 
earnings, yielding 25,146 observations from 1995 to 2007. Finally, the sample for the 
regression analysis varies with each measure of conditional conservatism. 
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the largest sample for which we report 
regression results. Of the 22,605 firm-year observations, 2,088 observations correspond 
to firms with a five-year pattern of earnings increases. Total accruals scaled by lagged 
total assets (TA/A) are on average negative. The market-to-book ratio (MB) is well 
above one, suggesting the presence of unconditional conservatism. Special items scaled 
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by lagged total assets (special items/A) are on average negative, consistent with the 
results in prior research (e.g., Callen et al. 2010; García Lara et al., 2011).  
Table 1 also presents means for earnings beaters (firms with a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings) and non-earnings beaters (firms without a five-year pattern of 
increasing earnings) separately and t-tests for differences in means across the two 
subsamples. Earnings beaters have significantly higher share price, earnings, EPS, CFO 
and returns than non-earnings beaters. Non-earnings beaters have significantly lower 
sales, total assets, market capitalization (MV), market-to-book ratio (MB) and size than 
earnings beaters. Earnings scaled by lagged total assets (Earnings/A) is 0.13 for 
earnings beaters versus 0.08 for non-earnings beaters and the difference is significant. 
The value of CFO scaled by lagged total assets (CFO/A) is 0.16 for earnings beaters 
and it is significantly higher than scaled CFO for non-earnings beaters (0.12). Total 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets (TA/A) are similar for earnings beaters and for 
non-earnings beaters and not significantly different. The scaled special items (special 
items/A) are not significantly different from earnings beaters to non-earnings beaters. 
The average of periodic non-operating accruals (NonAccr) is not significantly different 
across the two subsamples. 
Table 1 also presents the distribution of our four measures of conditional 
conservatism. The statistics of the measures are given in terms of their magnitudes. The 
first measure of conservatism, Con_Earkew, the negative of skewness of earnings 
deflated by the skewness of CFO, is -0.62 for earnings beaters compared to -1.06 for 
non-earnings beaters, but the difference is not significant. The second measure of 
conservatism, Con_NonAccr, the negative of accumulated nonoperating accruals over 
five years deflated by five-year accumulated total assets, is 0.03 for earnings beaters 
versus 0.02 for nonearnings beaters and the difference is significant. The difference of 
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the third measure, Con_CScore_ret, between earning beaters and non-earnings beaters 
is not significant. The fourth measure of conditional conservatism, Con_CScore_ni, is 
0.30 for earnings beaters and -0.06 for non-earnings beaters and the difference is 
significant. In addition, earnings beaters report significantly higher growth in book 
value of equity (Growth5) and lower financial risk (Leverage), compared with non-
earnings beaters. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for firm characteristics and for the four measures 
of conditional conservatism used in this study. Table 2 Panel A presents Pearson 
correlations between firm characteristics. Share price (PRICE) exhibits strong positive 
correlation with earnings, EPS, Size, Growth5, and BVS, and significantly negative 
correlation with non-operating accruals and Leverage. Consistent with prior studies, 
earnings are positively correlated with scaled CFO (0.03) and negatively correlated 
with non-operating accruals and Leverage. EPS exhibits strong positive correlation with 
scaled cash flows, size, Growth5 and BVS and negative correlation with leverage. 
In Panel B, we show the correlation matrix between the measures of conditional 
conservatism interacted with DBEAT5 (dummy capturing whether the firm reports a 5 
year stream of earnings increases). The negative of the skewness of earnings, 
DBEAT5*Con_Earskew, does not exhibit strong correlation with the other three 
measures. The negative accumulated non-operating accruals (DBEAT5*Con_NonAccr) 
present strong positive correlation with two CScore measures and the correlation 
coefficients are 0.28 and 0.33, respectively. Moreover, the two CScore measures are 
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significantly correlated.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
3.4.3 Empirical results 
We estimate Equation (1) using standard errors clustered by firm and year to control 
for serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence (Petersen, 2009). We include year 
and industry dummies to control for fixed effects.  
Table 3 reports the regression-based tests regarding whether market participants 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to earnings beaters that are more conditionally 
conservative. In particular, the measures for conditional conservatism in Table 3 are the 
negative of the skewness of earnings (ܥܱܰ_ܧܽݎݏ݇݁ݓ) and accumulated nonoperating 
accruals (ܥܱܰ_ܰ݋݊ܣܿܿݎ). The first column shows baseline results of basic price-
earnings multiples and other factors that theory suggests and prior empirical work has 
shown to have significant effects on share price. The results are consistent with our 
predictions regarding significantly positive coefficients on growth of book value of 
equity (ܧܲܵ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄5) (4.993, t = 2.88) and on book value of equity per share (BVS) 
(1.258, t = 3.60) and significantly negative coefficients on earnings variability (ܧܲܵ ∗
ܧݒܽݎ) (0, t = -1.80) and on leverage (ܧܲܵ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁) (-2.481, -5.98). Column 2 
shows that the coefficient on the variable ܧܲܵ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5 is significant and positive 
(2.940, t = 4.51), consistent with Barth et al. (1999) that firms with a five-year pattern 
of increasing earnings have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms.8 
                                                      
8 Although a five-year pattern is an arbitrary choice, untabulated tests show that market participants also 
assign higher price-earnings multiples to firms that have patterns of consecutive earnings increases from 
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In column 3, the coefficient of ܦܤܧܣܶ5 is 2.945 (t = 4.52), and the coefficient of 
the interaction term between ܦܤܧܣܶ5  and the first measure of conditional 
conservatism, the skewness of earnings (ܥܱܰ_ܧܽݎݏ݇݁ݓሻ, is 0.006 (t = 3.09), indicating 
that market participants assign a larger price-earnings multiples to firms with a stream 
of earnings increases that are more conservative, which is consistent with our 
predictions.9 Column 4 shows that market participants reward earnings beaters (2.309, 
t = 3.62), and the coefficient on the interaction term of ܦܤܧܣܶ5 and the five-year 
accumulated nonoperating accruals (ܥܱܰ_ܰ݋݊ܣܿܿݎ) is significant and positive (24.66, 
t = 1.87), consistent with our hypothesis that firms with a pattern on earnings increases 
obtain higher reward if they commit to more conditional conservative reporting. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
We conduct the same tests using our two CScore measures as proxies for conditional 
conservatism and the results are shown in Table 4. Column 1 shows that the coefficient 
on earnings beaters is 3.072 (t = 2.68) and the coefficient on 	ܧܲܵ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5 ∗
ܥ݋݊_ܥܵܿ݋ݎ݁_ݎ݁ݐ is 0.153 (t = 1.67), indicating that price-earnings multiples are higher 
for more conservative earnings beaters than for other earnings beaters after controlling 
for risk.10  
We repeat the analysis using the other CScore measure,	ܥ݋݊_ܥܵܿ݋ݎ݁_݊݅, as a proxy 
for conditional conservatism. Column 2 in Table 4 shows that the coefficient on 
                                                      
two years through eleven years.  
9 We obtain similar inferences if we use net income (COMPUSTAT #172). 
10 We do not control for size because the interaction variable DBEAT5*size is highly correlated with 
DBEAT5 and the correlation coefficient is 0.96. Ryan (2006) argues that the main drawback of controlling 
for many factors in conservatism literature is an inevitable association between these factors and the 
variables of interest.  
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interaction term ܧܲܵ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5 ∗ ܥ݋݊_ܥܵܿ݋ݎ݁_݊݅  is 3.456 (t = 3.35) after 
controlling for market-to-book and leverage, indicating that market participants assign 
additional rewards to firms use more conservative accounting on earnings increases. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent with the preceding findings in Table 3 
that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to earnings beaters with 
a five-year pattern of increasing earnings when these earnings beaters’ accounting is 
more conditionally conservative.  
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we exam whether conditional conservatism affects market rewards to 
firms that achieve a long stream of consecutive increases in earnings. We hypothesize 
that market rewards are reinforced when firms with an earnings stream exhibit a higher 
degree of conditional conservatism. The argument builds on the idea that conditional 
conservatism is a governance mechanism that curbs income-increasing earnings 
management and, thus, reduces information asymmetries between managers and 
outside investors. Thereby, the stream of consecutive earnings increases is more likely 
to be genuine, and not fabricated through earnings management, when the firm is more 
conditionally conservative. 
We capture conditional conservatism using four firm-year specific measures: the 
skewness of earnings deflated by the skewness of cash flows and accumulated 
nonoperating accruals deflated by accumulated total assets, based on the work of Givoly 
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and Hayn (2000), and two CScore measures, based on the work of Khan and Watts 
(2009). 
Using a large US sample for the period 1995-2007, our results show that conservative 
accounting strengthens market rewards to firms achieving a five-year pattern of 
earnings increases. The results are based on tests that include controls for growth 
opportunities, financial and operating risks, and other factors that are potentially 
correlated with measures of conditional conservatism and stock prices. 
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Appendix  
Variable Descriptions and Definitions 
Variables Data Description and COMPUSTAT Item Number 
PRICE Close price-fiscal year end (#199) 
Earnings NIBE, net income before extraordinary items, COMPUSTAT #18 
DBEAT5 An indicator variable equals to 1 when a firm reports 5-year patterns of 
increasing positive earnings and 0 otherwise 
Shares Number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS, COMPUSTAT #54 
EPS net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares 
outstanding for basic EPS ( #54) 
CFO Cash flow from operations (#308) 
R Return, (Price - Pricet-1 / Pricet-1)  
DR An indicator variable equal to 1 when R<0 and 0 otherwise 
Sales Net sales ( #12) 
MV Market value of equity (#199*#25) 
MB Market-to-book ratio, market capitalization (#199*#25) divided by book value of equity (#60/# 54) 
Size Log of the market value of equity 
A Total assets (#6) 
Earnings/A NIBE scaled by lagged total assets 
CFO/A Cash flows from operations scaled by lagged total assets 
TA/A Total accruals scaled by lagged total assets, the difference between Earnings and CFO 
Special items/A Special items (#17) divided by total assets 
NonAccr Net income (#172) + depreciation (#14) – CFO (#308) –  accounts receivable 
(#2) +  inventories (#3) –  prepaid expenses (#160) +  accounts payable 
(#70) +  taxes payable (#71) 
Con_Earskew -1*(The skewness of Earnings deflated by the skewness of CFO) 
Con_Nonaccr -1*(Five-year accumulated NonAccr deflated by accumulated total assets) 
Con_CScore_ret 
Estimated by substituting size, market-to-book and leverage to coefficient of 
incremental timeliness of bad news (C_Score_ret) relative to good news from 
Basu’s (1997) regression 
Con_CScore_ni 
Estimated by substituting size, market-to-book and leverage to coefficient of 
incremental timeliness of bad news (C_Score_ret) relative to good news from 
Basu’s (1997) transitory earnings regression 
Leverage The sum of short-term debt (#34) and long-term debt (#9) divided by market capitalization (#199*#25) 
Evar 
Variance of the past five years’ percentage change in earnings ሺNIBE୧,୲ െ
NIBE୧,୲ିଵሻ/absሺNIBE୧,୲ିଵ) 
Ggrowth5 Five-year compound annual growth rate of book value of equity (#60), (BVt/BVt-6)1/5-1 
BVS Book value of equity per share (#60/# 54) 
Note: All variables are in millions of dollars except number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(#54), which units are millions. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables  
Full Sample, 1995-2007 Ear. Beaters Non Beaters t-statistic 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. N Mean Mean (Diff. in Mean)
PRICE 19.072 14.20 22.56 22,605 27.50  18.22  18.05***
Returns 0.13 0.12 0.46 22,441 0.18 0.13 4.30***
Earnings 214.74 19.23 981.01 22,605 480.58 187.69 13.05***
EPS 1.04 0.74 1.10 22,605 1.46 0.99 18.69***
Earnings/A 0.08 0.07 0.07 22,605 0.13 0.08 31.26***
CFO 368.42 30.94 1622.97 22,443 720.10 332.51 10.42***
CFO/A 0.12 0.11 0.27 22,443 0.16 0.12 7.62***
Total Accruals (TA) -153.78 -9.11 793.16 22,243 -236.69 -145.31 -5.00***
Total Assets (A) 3440.72 349.77 17648.40 22,605 7291.31 3048.86 10.24***
TA/A -0.03 -0.04 0.27 22,443 -0.03 -0.03 0.44
Sales 3259.81 390.58 12921.84 22,605 6582.32 2921.68 12.37***
MV 4517.63 393.84 19808.96 22,550 11384.65 3816.87 16.73***
MB 3.17 2.08 12.94 22,549 4.42 3.04 4.65***
Size 5.94 5.98 2.32 22,550 7.38 5.80 30.40***
Special items/A -0.02 0.00 1.50 20,574 -0.00 -0.02 0.63
NonAccr -55.23 -2.37 1297.52 22,342 -259.98 -34.33 -0.84
Con_Earskew -1.02 -0.19 228.55 22,274 -0.62 -1.06 0.08
Con_Nonaccr 0.02 0.02 0.13 21,853 0.03 0.02 2.66***
Con_CScore_ret 2.28 0.53 38.32 22,530 1.77 2.33 -0.64
Con_CScore_ni -0.02 -0.05 1.12 22,530 0.30 -0.06 14.10***
Leverage 0.39 0.15 1.07 22,550 0.17  0.41  -9.83***
Evar 945.35 1.54 32101.12 22,605 10.21  1040.52  -1.397
Ggrowth5 0.17 0.13 0.24 22,605 0.27  0.16  21.50***
BVS 8.43 6.47 8.85 22,605 8.13  8.09  0.20 
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Table 1 (continued) 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*/**/*** indicate Significance at the 10%/5% /1% .  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). Returns = (Price - Pricet-1 / Pricet-1). Earnings = net income before 
extraordinary items (Compustat #18). EPS = net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(Compustat #54). A = total assets (Compustat #6). Earnings/A = net income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. CFO = cash flows 
from operations (Compustat #308). CFO/A = cash flows from operations divided by lagged total assets. Total Accruals (TA) = the difference 
between net income before extraordinary items and cash flows from operations. TA/A = total accruals divided by lagged total assets. Sales = net 
sales (Compustat #12). MV = Market capitalization, close price per share times the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat #25). MB 
= market capitalization (#199*#25) divided by book value of equity (#60/# 54). Size = Log of the market value of equity. Special items/A = 
Special items (#17) divided by total assets. NonAcrr = Nonoperating Accruals, net income (#172) + depreciation (#14) – CFO (#308) –  accounts 
receivable (#2) +  inventories (#3) –  prepaid expenses (#160) +  accounts payable (#70) +  taxes payable (#71) Con_Earskew = -1*(the 
skewness of Earnings deflated by the skewness of CFO). Con_NonAcc = -1*(five-year accumulated NonAccr deflated by accumulated total 
assets). Con_CSore_ret = the incremental timeliness of bad new relative to good news from Basu’s (1997) regression and is a function of three 
firm-specific characters: size, market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio. Con_Cscore_ni = the incremental timeliness of bad new relative to good 
news from Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) regression and is a function of three firm-specific characters: size, market-to-book and leverage ratio. 
Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the 
past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5= 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per 
share. 
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Table 2 Correlation Matrix among Key Variables 
Panel A: Correlation Matrix among Key Variables  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix among Measures of Conditional Conservatism  
 DBEAT5*Con_Earskew DBEAT5*Con_NonAccr DBEAT5*Con_CScore_ret
DBEAT5*Con_Earskew 1   
DBEAT5*Con_NonAccr 0.02 1   
DBEAT5*Con_CScore_ret  -0.00 0.28 ** 1  
DBEAT5*Con_CScore_ni 0.01 0.33 ** 0.27 **
 
 
 Firm Characteristics Controls 
 PRICE Returns Earnings EPS CFO/A MB Size Special items/A 
NonAccr Leverage Evar Growth5 BVS 
Returns 0.10** 1  
Earnings  0.21** -0.01 1  
EPS 0.62** 0.04** 0.27** 1  
CFO/A 0.40** 0.08** 0.03** 0.05** 1  
MB 0.05** 0.05** 0.03** 0.01 0.02 1  
Size 0.50** 0.06** 0.41** 0.42** 0.10** 0.08** 1  
Special items/A 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 1 
NonAccr -0.04** 0.00 -0.27** -0.02 -0.01** -0.00 -0.09** 0.00 1 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02
Con_Earskew 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00
Con_NonAccr 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.17** 0.02 -0.00 -0.04** -0.01 0.00 -0.05** -0.02
Con_CScore_ret -0.01 -0.11** -0.01 -0.01 0.01** 0.00 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.01
Con_CScore_ni 0.27** -0.08** 0.21** 0.21** 0.05** 0.01 0.53*** 0.01 -0.03** -0.24** -0.00 0.10** 0.15**
Leverage -0.10** -0.15** -0.03** -0.03** 0.00 -0.03** -0.18* -0.01 -0.01 1 -0.00 -0.09** 0.01
Evar -0.01 0..01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 1 0.00 -0.01
Growth5 0.10** -0.02 0.01 0.03** -0.00 -0.07** 0.16** 0.00 -0.01 -0.09** 0.00 1 0.05**
BVS 0.69** -0.07** 0.09** 0.60** 0.11** -0.07** 0.29** 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.05** 1
81 
 
Table 3 
Analysis of the Effects of Conditional Conservatism on Market Regards to Earnings Beaters  
Earnings-based Measures of Conditional Conservatism Based on Givoly and Hayn (2000) 
  1 2 3 4 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept ? 1.061
(0.99) 
1.057
(0.97) 
1.095
(1.00)
 1.153 
(1.04) 
 
EPS + 6.228
(3.73)
***
 
5.749
(3.37)
**
 
5.774
(3.35)
*** 5.763 
(3.31) 
***
EPS*DBEAT5 +  2.940
(4.51)
***
 
2.942
(4.52)
*** 2.309 
(3.62) 
***
EPS*DBEAT5*Con_Earskew +   0.006(3.09)
***   
EPS*DBEAT5*Con_NonAccr +  24.657 
(1.87) 
* 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.993
(2.88)
*** 4.792
(2.46)
**
 
4.819
(2.49)
** 4.9738 
(2.35) 
**
EPS*Leverage - -2.481
(-5.98)
*** -2.389
(-5.80)
*** -2.321
(-5.52)
*** -2.323 
(-5.36) 
***
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.80)
*
 
-0.000
(-1.59) 
-0.000
(-1.91)
* -0.000 
(-1.92) 
* 
BVS + 1.258
(3.60)
*** 1.279
(3.65)
*** 1.270
(3.58)
*** 1.271 
(3.55) 
***
R-Squared  0.574 0.579 0.584 0.583 
Nobs 22605 22605 22217 21817 
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and 
year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed). 
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). 
DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings 
and 0 otherwise. Con_Earskew = -1*(the skewness of Earnings deflated by the skewness of CFO). 
Con_NonAcc = -1*(five-year accumulated NonAccr deflated by accumulated total assets). Leverage 
= sum of short-term debt (Compustat # 34) and long-term debt (Compustat # 9) divided by market 
capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year 
compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 4 
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and 
year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 10%/5%/1% (two-tailed). 
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before 
extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS (Compustat #54). 
DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings 
and 0 otherwise. C_Sore = the incremental timeliness of bad news relative to good news from Basu’s 
(1997) regression and is a function of three firm-specific characters: size, market-to-book and 
leverage. Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt (Compustat # 9) 
divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. 
Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per 
share. Size is not included in controls because the correlation coefficient between EPS*DBEAT5 and 
EPS*DBEAT5*size is 0.97, and EPS*DBEAT5 is our primary variable of interests. 
 
 
 
Analysis of the Effects of Conditional Conservatism on Market Regards to Earnings Beaters  
CScore Measures of Conditional Conservatism Based on Khan and Watts (2003) 
  earnings-return regression 
transitory income 
regression 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept ? 0.992
(0.92)
1.163
(1.08)
 
EPS + 5.513
(3.24)
*** 5.491
(3.22)
** 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 3.072
(2.68)
*** 1.560
(1.35)
 
EPS*DBEAT5*Con_CScore_ret + 0.153
(1.67)
*  
EPS*DBEAT5*Con_CScore_ear + 3.456
(3.35)
*** 
EPS*Growth5 + 5.014
(2.70)
*** 5.043
(2.74)
*** 
EPS*Leverage - -2.104
(-5.57)
*** -2.105
(-5.56)
*** 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.51)
-0.000
(-1.52)
 
BVS + 1.297
(3.70)
*** 1.298
(3.70)
*** 
EPS*DBEAT5*Leverage  -7.489
(-5.10)
*** -6.328
(-4.22)
*** 
EPS*DBEAT5*MB  0.365
(2.44)
** 0.349
(2.45)
** 
R-Squared  0.59 0.59 
Nobs 22529 22529
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Chapter 4. Analysis of Patterns of Growth in Sales 
4.1 Introduction 
Since earnings are the net of sales revenue and expenses, a pattern of increasing 
earnings can be sustained by growth in sales and/or reduction in expenses. The 
competitive strategy literature, starting with Porter (1980, 1985) indicates that growth 
supported by increases in sales is more sustainable than growth supported by cutting 
expenses. This is so as growth supported by increasing revenues is indicative of a strong 
competitive advantage (firms products or services being highly demanded and also 
being difficult to emulate, reflecting the success of underlying product differentiation 
strategy). Based on this literature, Ghosh et al. (2005) show that firms reporting 
consecutive earnings increases together with sales growth have higher price-earnings 
multiples than firms reporting earnings increases through reductions in expenses. Their 
results are in line with those in Ertimur et al. (2003), who show that the market reaction 
to earnings surprises is different when these surprises are revenue-driven surprise or 
expense-driven surprises. 
In this study, we focus on market rewards to a long stream of consecutive increases 
in earnings. We do not address whether the rewards differ for firms that achieve the 
rewards through increases in revenues or decreases in expenses. Instead, we argue, 
based on the results of prior research on competitive strategy that sustaining a long 
stream of earnings increases (five years in our main tests) seems complicated just 
reducing expenses. Given this, we use sales growth to gauge whether the stream of 
consecutive increases in earnings is genuine. We argue that a firm with annually 
increasing earnings is non-suspect of having engaged in earnings management to 
fabricate the earnings pattern whenever the earnings pattern is supported by the same 
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pattern of sales increases. 
4.2 Research Design and Sample Selection 
As in the prior two chapters we adapt the model used in Barth et al. (1999), 
incorporating an additional variable to capture whether a firm with a long stream of 
earnings increases (we consider five years in our main tests) also present a stream of 
increases in sales. The model is as follows: 
ܴܲܫܥܧ௜,௧ ൌ 	 		ߚ଴ ൅ 	ߚଵ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚଶ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧	
																														൅	ߚଷ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܦܤܧܣܶ5௜,௧ ∗ ܦܵܣܮܧ5௜,௧	
																														൅	ߚସ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݓݐ݄5,௜,௧ ൅ ߚହ	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௧ 
																														൅	ߚ଺	ܧܲ ௜ܵ,௧ ∗ ܧݒܽݎ௜,௧ ൅ ߚ଻	ܤܸ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧                     (1) 
Where i indexes the firm and t indexes the year. PRICE is share price at the fiscal year 
end (COMPUSTAT #199). EPS is income before extraordinary items, NIBE 
(COMPUSTAT #18), divided by number of common shares outstanding for basic EPS, 
(COMPUSTAT #54).  
Throughout our tests and to identify firms that report a pattern of increasing earnings, 
we focus on income before extraordinary items, NIBE. Equation (1) includes an 
indicator variable DBEAT5୧୲  that takes value 1 if firm i  continuously reports 
increasing positive earnings for five years, and 0 otherwise. We expect that βଶ  is 
positive, indicating that firms with a five-year pattern of increasing positive earnings 
have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms (Barth et al., 1999).  
We refer to firms with a five-year pattern both in earnings increases and sales 
increases as non-suspect sales beaters. We define non-suspect sales beaters using an 
interaction indicator of DBEAT5୧,୲ ∗ 	DSALE5୧,୲ that takes value 1 if firm i reports both 
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five-year patterns of earnings increases and sales increases in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
The indicator variable DSALE5i,t takes the value of 1 if firm i has a five-year pattern of 
increasing net sales revenue (COMPUSTAT #12) in year t, and 0 otherwise. Regarding 
whether there are additional rewards to non-suspect sales beaters, we expect coefficient 
βଷ to be positive, implying that non-suspect sales beaters ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DSALE5୧୲ ൌ
1ሻ  enjoy higher price-earnings multiples than the rest of firms with a pattern of 
increasing earnings ሺDBEAT5୧୲ ∗ DSALE5୧୲ ൌ 0ሻ. 
We use the same sample as in Chapter 2. Table 1 Panel A presents the number of 
firms with five-year patterns of increasing positive earnings, cash flows and sales 
revenues from 1990 to 2007. Column 4 shows the number of firms with different 
patterns of increasing sales. The number declines at a rate of around 30% with the length 
of patterns. Column 6 shows the percentage of firms with a pattern of increasing 
earnings that have also the same pattern of increasing sales. We can see that the 
percentage is quite large. This might be due to firms just growing in size. Given this, 
the focus on our tests is, in fact, the firms that while reporting a pattern of increasing 
earnings do not report a pattern of increasing sales. These firms can be safely classified 
as suspect, and we expect them to obtain lower market rewards (if any rewards at all) 
in the stock market. 
In Panel B, we show that from the 2,088 firm-year observations with a five-year 
pattern of consecutive increases in earnings, we classify 81% (1,690) as non-suspect 
sales beaters. That is, 1,690 firm-year observations also present a five year pattern of 
consecutive increases in sales revenues. In Panel C we show the correlation matrix 
between the non-suspect and the four types of suspect firms. Non-suspect sales beaters 
are positively correlated with all the suspect measures. The largest correlation (46%) 
corresponds to non-suspect sales beaters and suspect firms with discretionary expenses. 
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These large correlations are somehow expected given the large number of earnings 
beaters that are also sales beaters. Thus, the main focus of our tests is on the firms that 
report the pattern of increasing earnings without the same pattern in sales. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
4.3 Empirical results 
Table 2 reports the regression-based tests regarding pricing effects on non-suspect 
CFO beaters (firms with five-year patterns both in earnings increases and cash flow 
increases), and non-suspect sales beaters( firms with five-year patterns both in earnings 
increases and sales increases). Column 4 shows that the coefficient on	EPS ∗ DBEAT5 ∗
DSALE5 is significantly positive (2.670, t = 3.80), indicating that non-suspect sales 
beaters have higher price-earnings multiples than other firms, consistent with our 
prediction. The result is consistent with Ghosh et al. (2005) that firms with sales-
supported earnings increases are rewarded. In addition, the measure of non-suspect 
sales beaters nearly captures the information of earnings beaters, resulting in the 
insignificant coefficient on earnings beaters (0.821, t = 1.34). This is expected, as the 
coefficient on earnings beaters is now capturing just the effect of firms that report the 
patterns of earnings increases without growth in sales. That is, this coefficient captures 
now the market rewards for suspect beaters. As we can see, suspect firms are not 
rewarded by market participates. 
Finally, Column 5 shows that coefficient on the variable EPS ∗ DBEAT5  is 
insignificantly (0.577, t = 0.97), and the coefficient on the interaction term	DBEAT5 ∗
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DCFO5 is 3.403 (t = 2.47), indicating that market participants assign higher price-
earnings multiples to non-suspect beaters with growth of cash flows. In addition, the 
positive price-earnings multiples of the interaction term DBEAT5 ∗ DSALE5 is 2.386 
(t = 3.27) indicate that market participants assign higher rewards to non-suspect beaters 
with growth of sales, and that suspect firms are not rewarded. 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Given the large number of firms with a large stream of increases in earnings that also 
present a stream of increases in sales, an alternative way to show the results in Table 2 
that might be easier to interpret is creating the dummy variable the other way around. 
That is, we can create an indicator variable SUSPECT_REV5௜,௧ taking the value of 1 if 
firm i does not report increasing sales revenues for five years, and 0 otherwise. We 
define an interaction term DBEAT5௜,௧ ∗ SUSPECT_REV5௜,௧ that takes value 1 if firm i 
reports a five-year pattern of earnings increases but not a five-year pattern of increasing 
sales, and 0 otherwise. 
Table 3 Panel A shows that of the 2,088 earnings beaters (firms with a five-year 
pattern of earnings increases), 19% (398) do not report a five-year pattern of sales 
growth. We view this group of earnings beaters as suspect firms that might have used 
earnings management to maintain the earnings pattern. Panel B shows that the 
coefficient on EPS௜,௧ ∗ DBEAT5௜,௧ is significantly positive (3.530, t = 4.73), and the 
coefficient on EPS௜,௧ ∗ DBEAT5௜,௧ ∗ SUSPECT_REV5௜,௧ is significantly negative (-2.70, 
t = -3.80), meaning that market participants assign lower price-earnings multiples to 
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suspect firms when their pattern of increasing earnings is not achieved through sales 
growth. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
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Table 1 
Panel A: Number of Firms Reporting Patterns of Positive Earnings Increases, Positive CFO Increases, Both in Positive Earnings and Positive CFO Increases, and 
Both in Positive Earnings and Positive Sales Increases  
Num. of  
Years 
Num. of  
Earnings Beaters 
 
Num. of  
CFO Beaters 
Num. of  
Sales Beaters 
Num. of Non-suspect 
CFO Beaters  
(% of Earnings Beaters ) 
Num. of Non-suspect 
Sales Beaters  
(% of Earnings Beaters) 
1 21995  22468  44833  12791 (0.58) 19826 (0.90) 
2 11369  9162  28058  4428 (0.39) 9935 (0.87) 
3 6292  4070  18853    1806 (0.29) 5362 (0.85) 
4 3601  1973  12932  813 (0.23) 3002 (0.83) 
5 2088  993  8844  368 (0.18) 1690 (0.81) 
6 1246  535  6052  18 (0.15) 984 (0.79) 
7 767  291  4199  105 (0.14) 610 (0.80) 
8 484  157  2961  61 (0.13) 390 (0.81) 
9 313  82  2088  33 (0.11) 249 (0.80) 
10 203  41  1461  14 (0.07) 160 (0.79) 
11 136  19  1039  3 (0.02) 107 (0.79) 
12 95  9  760  0 (0) 72 (0.76) 
 
 
 
 
Earnings = net income before extraordinary items (Compustat #18). CFO = cash flows from operations (Compustat #308). Sales = net sales (Compustat #12) 
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Table 1  
Panel B: Number and Percentages of Non-suspect CFO Beaters, Non-suspect Sales Beaters and Suspect Firms for a five Year Stream of Consecutive Earnings 
Increases 
Earnings Beaters Non-suspect  CFO Beaters 
Non-suspect  
Sales Beaters 
Suspect  
(Accruals) 
Suspect 
(Sales)   
Suspect 
(Overprod.) 
Suspect  
(Disc. Exp.) 
2088 368 (18%) 1690 (81%) 396 (19%) 251 (12%) 616 (30%) 1015 (49%) 
   
Table 1 
Panel C: Correlation Matrix between Non-suspect CFO Beaters, Non-suspect Sales Beaters and the Four Types of Suspects Firms 
  
 Non-suspect (CFO) Non-suspect (Sales) Suspect (accruals) Suspect (sales) Suspect (overprod.) 
Non-suspect (Sales) 0.30 **      
Suspect (accruals) 0.13 ** 0.34 **     
Suspect (sales) 0.01  0.23 ** 0.12 **    
Suspect (overprod.) 0.13 ** 0.34 ** 0.26 ** 0.28 **   
Suspect (disc. expenses) 0.25 ** 0.46 ** 0.39 ** 0.19 ** 0.44 ** 
 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-suspect CFO Beaters and Non-suspect Sales Beaters 
N=22,605   1 2 3 4 5 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept ? 1.061
(0.99)
 
 
1.057
(0.97)
 
 
1.047
(0.96)
 
 
1.058
(0.97)
 
 
1.049
(0.96)
 
 
EPS + 6.228
(3.73)
*** 
 
5.749
(3.37)
** 
 
5.756
(3.37)
** 
 
5.753
(3.37)
***
 
5.759
(3.37)
*** 
 
EPS*DBEAT5 +   2.940
(4.51)
*** 
 
2.398
(3.86)
*** 
 
0.831
(1.34)
 
 
0.577
(0.97)
 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*DCFO5 +     3.696(2.74)
** 
 
  3.403
(2.47)
** 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*DSALE5 +       2.670(3.80)
***
 
2.386
(3.27)
*** 
 
EPS*GROWTH + 4.993
(2.88)
*** 
 
4.792
(2.46)
** 
 
4.741
(2.40)
** 
 
4.729
(2.38)
** 
 
4.690
(2.34)
*** 
 
EPS*LEVERAGE - -2.481
(-5.98)
*** 
 
-2.389
(-5.80)
*** 
 
-2.382
(-5.80)
*** 
 
-2.383
(-5.81)
***
 
-2.377
(-5.81)
*** 
 
EPS*EVAR - -0.000
(-1.80)
* 
 
-0.000
(-1.59)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
-0.000
(-1.57)
 
 
BVS + 1.258
(3.60)
*** 
 
1.279
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.280
(3.65)
*** 
 
1.280
(3.66)
***
 
1.281
(3.66)
*** 
 
R-Squared   0.574 0.579 0.580 0.580 0.580 
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Table 2 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Non-suspect CFO Beaters and Non-suspect Sales Beaters 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are based on firm and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 
10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic EPS 
(Compustat #54). DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise. DCFO5: indicator variable equals 
1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive cash flows, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DCFO5: interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports five-year 
patterns both in earnings increases and in cash flows increases, and 0 otherwise. 
DSALE5: indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-year pattern of increasing positive net sales, and 0 otherwise. DBEAT5*DSALE5: interaction indicator variable 
equals 1 if a firm reports five-year patterns both in earnings increases and in sales increases, and 0 otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-
term debt (Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of 
book value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Table 3 
Analysis of Market Rewards to Firms with a Pattern of Increasing Earnings Not 
Achieved through Sales Growth 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics to suspect sales firms 
Num. of 
Years 
Num. of  
Total Observations 
Num. of  
Earnings Beaters
Num. of Suspect Firms   
(% over Earnings Beaters) 
5 22605 2088 398 (0.19) 
 
Panel B: Regression Results 
N=22,605    
Variable Predicted 
 Sign 
Coef. 
(t-statistic) 
Intercept 
     
? 1.058
(0.97)
 
 
EPS + 5.753
(3.37)
*** 
 
EPS*DBEAT5 + 3.350
(4.73)
*** 
 
EPS*DBEAT5*SUSPECT_REV5 - -2.70
(-3.80)
*** 
EPS*Growth5 + 4.729
(2.38)
** 
 
EPS*Leverage - -2.383
(-5.81)
*** 
EPS*Evar - -0.000
(-1.58)
 
 
BVS + 1.280
(3.66)
*** 
R-Squared  0.580
 
Year and industry dummies are included in all models. t-statistic in parentheses are 
based on firm and year clustered standard errors. */**/*** indicate significance at 
10%/5%/1% (two-tailed).  
PRICE = close price per share at the fiscal year end (Compustat #199). EPS = net 
income before extraordinary items divided by number of shares outstanding for basic 
EPS (Compustat #54). DBEAT5 = indicator variable equals 1 if a firm reports a 5-
year pattern of increasing positive earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
DBEAT5*SUSPECT_REV5 = interaction indicator variable equals 1 if a firm 
reports a five-year pattern in earnings increases but not sales growth, and 0 
otherwise. Leverage = sum of short-term debt (Compustat #34) and long-term debt 
(Compustat #9) divided by market capitalization. Evar = variance of the past 5 years’ 
percentage change in earnings. Growth5 = 5-year compound growth rate of book 
value of equity. BVS = book value of equity per share. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I analyze whether market rewards to firms with a pattern of 
consecutive increases in earnings differ according to whether the pattern is either 
genuine or fabricated. I use growth in cash flows and conditional accounting 
conservatism as signals of whether the earnings stream is genuine. As signals to identify 
that the earnings stream is fabricated, I look at accrual-based earnings management and 
the manipulation of real operational activities.  
The results show that market participants assign higher price-earnings multiples to 
firms when their earnings stream comes together with the same stream of increases in 
cash flows, or with a higher degree of conditional conservatism. This evidence is 
consistent with growth in cash flows and conditional conservatism being useful signals 
to identify whether the stream of consecutive earnings increases is genuine.  
Regarding the market rewards to firms that engage in several earnings management 
types to fabricrate the earnings stream, the results show that market participants 
penalize firms that increase credit sales beyond whatever is advisable by common 
practice. I also find penalties to firms that overproduce to reduce cost of goods sold to 
create the pattern of increasing earnings. However, market participants do not penalize 
firms that opportunistically cut discretionary expenses, including R&D, advertising, 
and selling, general and administrative expenses, to create the earnings stream. 
